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LIVING WITH WATER IN A CLIMATE-CHANGED WORLD: 
WILL FEDERAL FLOOD POLICY SINK OR SWIM? 
BY 
A. DAN TARLOCK* & DEBORAH M. CHIZEWER** 
Global climate change will increase inland and coastal flooding, 
and strain already stressed flood damage prevention and mitigation 
systems. In the face of Congressional unwillingness to deal with the 
increased flood risks, the Obama Administration has undertaken 
several initiatives to support local resilience in the face of climate 
change-induced floods and sea level rise. We place these initiatives in 
the context of existing flood control and insurance programs which 
encourage moral hazard behavior. We argue that the reforms are 
promising, but the Obama Administration’s approach is severely limited 
because the existing patchwork of flood-related legislation remains 
unreformed. The current, competing missions could hinder the reforms’ 
effectiveness. The federal government’s lack of a comprehensive 
climate change response and its retreat from flood control spending 
pushes the problem to local governments that must cope with 
increased flood events. Local governments, however, face their own 
political, fiscal, and legal barriers to adapt to the increased risks of 
climate change-induced floods. In this constrained environment, the 
federal government should induce local governments to align their 
land-use policies with emerging federal policies. 
Local governments should lead on flood management because 
they are on the front lines of flooding; they also can most readily 
control land-use to manage floodplain development, a key strategy for 
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member of the faculties of the University of Kentucky and Indiana University, Bloomington. He 
is a National Associate of the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine and a 
lifetime member of the American Law Institute. In the fall of 2017, Professor Tarlock will be the 
Distinguished Natural Resources Visitor at the Lewis and Clark College of Law. 
** Debbie M. Chizewer teaches at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law in the Environmental 
Advocacy Clinic, and teaches an environmental law class at Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
Debbie received her J.D. from Boston University School of Law and her B.A., cum laude, from 
Princeton University. Immediately after law school, Debbie clerked for the Honorable Joseph 
Farnan, Jr, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. 
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reducing flood damage. We can no longer rely almost exclusively on 
structural solutions to coastal sea level rise, storm surges and inland 
floods. Science does not support this position. The federal and state 
governments must encourage integrated flood management by 
providing guidelines and increasing incentives. The proposed federal 
flood risk management standard, new commitments to regional climate 
data collection, and existing federal grant programs—such as hazard 
mitigation planning grants and community block development grants—
can provide important direction to local governments. Takings 
jurisprudence has the potential to chill these efforts. Courts also need 
to incorporate the moral hazard concept into takings analysis to 
support beneficial land-use policies that suit a climate-changed world.  
Ultimately, the United States should move toward the European 
Union’s risk-based flood management approach and adopt integrated 
floodplain and coastal management in a comprehensive federal 
statutory scheme. Federal involvement in flood management can 
prevent disparity between states and provide an integrated structure 
that works across states lines.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the face of rising sea levels and increasingly frequent extreme 
weather events,1 the Obama Administration has started to promote climate 
change adaptation. Because Congress has failed to pass any climate change 
mitigation or adaptation legislation,2 the Administration has created two task 
forces, issued several executive orders, and pushed federal agencies to 
develop adaptation plans.3 
The President’s actions reflect the reality that “[m]ore than 50 percent 
of Americans live in coastal counties, where key infrastructure and 
evacuation routes are increasingly vulnerable to impacts like higher sea 
levels, storm surges, and flooding.”4 Inland urban settlement areas near 
	
 1  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REDUCING COASTAL RISKS ON THE EAST AND 
GULF COASTS, 16 (2014); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-290, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN 
UPDATE 67 (2015) [hereinafter GAO-15-290] (citing U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM., 
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
ASSESSMENT (Jerry M. Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, & Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014)). 
 2  See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Change Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 
111th Cong. (2009), sponsored by Representatives Henry A. Waxman (D-Cal.) and Edward J. 
Markey (D-Mass.), would have addressed both mitigation and adaptation, but President Obama 
had to choose between advancing healthcare reform or the climate legislation in 2009–10, and 
he chose the former. Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/11/as-the-world-burns (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 3  See infra Part II.A. 
 4  Press Release, Council on Envtl. Quality, Fact Sheet: Taking Action to Protect 
Communities and Reduce the Cost of Future Flood Disasters, (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/Press_Releases 
/January_30_2015 (last visited July 16, 2016) (citing the National Climate Assessment finding 
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rivers and lakes also face increased flood risks caused by more frequent 
extreme rain events.5 People are drawn to live alongside or near water but 
tend to discount the risks inherent in this choice. This moral hazard behavior 
is no longer sustainable. Losses from worldwide flood events nearly doubled 
in the ten years from 2000 to 2009 compared with the prior decade.6 
Will the Obama Administration’s climate resilience reforms provide the 
appropriate fix to existing, inadequate federal flood management legislation? 
We consider the reforms in the context of existing federal flood-related 
programs and local land-use regulation of floodplains. The United States 
lacks comprehensive, federal flood management legislation, compared to the 
European Union, but rather relies on a hodgepodge of flood-related laws 
with differing missions and distinct lead federal agencies.7 Historically, these 
myriad programs did not employ integrated flood management techniques, 
but rather relied heavily on structural solutions. Local governments retained 
responsibility for coping with the remaining risks. In light of this history, we 
argue that these reforms will substantially improve the federal flood 
management program but represent only a first step toward risk-based flood 
damage reduction. 
We also consider whether the Obama Administration’s climate 
resilience reforms will encourage and support more consistent local 
government flood management. With little historical support or guidance 
	
that “[M]ore than $1 trillion of property and structures in the U.S. are at risk of inundation from 
sea level rise of two feet above current sea level – an elevation that could be reached as early as 
2050.”). 
 5  See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OVERVIEW OF THE ARKSTORM SCENARIO 2–15 (2011) 
(describing the flooding in California caused by the winter storms of 1861–62, and discussing 
the potential impact of such storms today), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1312/ 
of2010-1312_text.pdf. 
The [Atmospheric River 1,000 (ARkStorm)] has several public policy implications: (1) An 
ARkStorm raises serious questions about the ability of existing federal, state, and local 
disaster planning to handle a disaster of this magnitude. (2) A core policy issue raised is 
whether to pay now to mitigate, or pay a lot more later for recovery. (3) Innovative 
financing solutions are likely to be needed to avoid fiscal crisis and adequately fund 
response and recovery costs from a similar, real, disaster. (4) Responders and 
government managers at all levels could be encouraged to conduct risk assessments, and 
devise the full spectrum of exercises, to exercise ability of their plans to address a 
similar event. (5) ARkStorm can be a reference point for application of Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and California Emergency Management 
Agency guidance connecting federal, state and local natural hazards mapping and 
mitigation planning under the National Flood Insurance Plan and Disaster Mitigation Act 
of 2000. (6) Common messages to educate the public about the risk of such an extreme 
disaster as the ARkStorm scenario could be developed and consistently communicated 
to facilitate policy formulation and transformation. 
Id. at vi. 
 6  ZURICH INS. GRP. LTD, ENHANCING COMMUNITY FLOOD RESILIENCE: A WAY FORWARD 3 
(2014), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/zurichfloodresiliencealliance_ 
ResilienceIssueBrief_2014.pdf. 
 7  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 1, at 8, 31, 33, 46, 56 
(discussing the broad measures to reduce the consequences of flooding with no clear 
corresponding mission). 
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from the federal government, local governments have managed flood control 
with varying degrees of effectiveness. Some have engaged in a futile race 
with nature while others have moved forward with innovative, integrated 
flood management plans. In the months since these executive directives 
were issued, federal agencies already have released studies advancing more 
integrated planning and incorporating likely climate impacts.8 The federal 
government has participated in public-private partnerships to fund 
innovative, flood protection projects, including nonstructural flood 
management approaches.9 These incentive programs have the potential to 
encourage more local flood preparation as well. As executive branch 
measures, however, the climate resilience reforms will work only when the 
federal agencies willingly implement the guidelines.10 
The biggest problem with the Administration’s approach is that it leaves 
in place the existing patchwork of flood-related legislation. The current, 
competing missions could hinder the reforms’ effectiveness. Local 
governments face their own political, fiscal, and legal barriers to adapt to the 
increased risks of climate change-induced floods. The federal government 
must induce local governments to align their land-use policies with emerging 
federal policies because we can no longer rely almost exclusively on 
structural solutions to coastal sea level rise, storm surges, and inland floods. 
Science does not support that position. 
Local governments should lead on flood management because they are 
on the front lines of flooding; they also can most readily control land-use to 
manage floodplain development, a key strategy for reducing flood damage.11 
The federal and state governments must encourage integrated flood 
management by providing guidelines and increasing incentives. The 
proposed federal flood risk management standard, new commitments to 
regional climate data collection, and existing federal grant programs—such 
as hazard mitigation planning grants, and community block development 
grants—can provide important direction to local governments. 
	
 8  E.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NORTH ATLANTIC COAST COMPREHENSIVE STUDY: 
RESILIENT ADAPTATION TO INCREASING RISK, at i–xi (2015) [hereinafter NACCS],  
available at http://www.nad.usace.army.mil/Portals/40/docs/NACCS/NACCS_main_report.pdf; 
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 2011-OPPA-01, FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY 
STATEMENT 2–3 (2012) [hereinafter FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY STATEMENT], 
available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1919-25045-3330/508_climate_ 
change_policy_statement.pdf; Revised Draft Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies 
on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in NEPA 
Reviews, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,802, 77,823–31 (Dec. 24, 2014). 
 9  In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, six innovative, local flood management projects for the 
New York-New Jersey area recently received funding through the Rebuild by Design 
competition. Rebuild by Design, Finalists, http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/winners-and-finalists/ 
(last visited July 16, 2016). 
 10  Victor B. Flatt, Focus and Fund: Executing Our Way to a Federal Climate Change 
Adaptation Plan, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 166–67 (2014). 
 11  This is a world wide problem for cities. See S.H.A. Koop & C.J. van Leeuwen, The 
Challenges of Water, Waste and Climate Change in Cities, ENV’T, DEV. & SUSTAINABILITY, Feb. 1, 
2016 passim.  
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Ultimately, the United States should move toward the European 
Union’s risk-based flood management approach12 and adopt integrated 
floodplain and coastal management in a comprehensive federal statutory 
scheme. Floodplains and coastal areas must be managed through a 
combination of structural defenses, upstream storage, design modifications, 
and land-use controls including both retreat from vulnerable areas and 
integrated floodplain management. The formulation and adoption of an 
integrated policy will be extremely difficult, but it will avoid rising damage 
costs, increased public risks and social disruption, and will promote water 
security.13 
Part II of this Article details the Obama Administration’s climate 
resilience reform measures. Part III considers the effectiveness of existing 
flood-related federal laws. Part IV analyzes the climate resilience reforms’ 
ability to improve existing federal programs. Part V explores local 
government flood management, the available adaptation tools, and the 
obstacles posed by the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence. 
II. CLIMATE RESILIENCE REFORM 
A. Executive Action 
In the face of legislative resistance, indifference, and gridlock, 
President Obama has acted unilaterally to promote climate resilience 
planning. He has issued several executive orders to date.14 The first, 
	
 12  Council Directive 2007/60, 2007 O.J. (L 288) 27 (EC). See Debbie M. Chizewer & A. Dan 
Tarlock, New Challenges for Urban Areas Facing Flood Risks, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1739, 1766–
91 (2013) (discussing in detail the European Union Flood Directive and using it as a tool to 
evaluate examples of U.S. local governments’ flood management efforts).  
 13  The international water community has adopted the constructs of water stress and 
security as a measure of a country’s water well-being or its ability to mitigate flood risks. For a 
more extended discussion of these constructs, see A. Dan Tarlock, Toward a More Robust 
International Water Law of Cooperation to Address Droughts and Ecosystem Conservation, 28 
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 261, 263-265 (2016). Water stress has two meanings. The first refers to 
countries with poor hydrology, inadequate or excess rain. The second meaning of water stress 
is the lack of institutional capacity, such as storage, strong allocation systems, and effective 
management, to manage risks such as flooding. Water security has three dimensions: economic, 
social, and environmental. The first focuses on increasing water productivity and decreasing 
flood damage; the second on assuring equitable access; and the third focuses on sustainable 
management of aquatic ecosystem and the restoration of aquatic ecosystem services, including 
the widening of floodplains. EELCO VAN BECK & WOUTER LINCKLAEN ARRIENS, WATER SECURITY: 
PUTTING THE CONCEPT INTO PRACTICE 12–13 (2014) available at http://www.gwp.org/Global/ 
ToolBox/Publications/Background%20papers/GWP_TEC20_web.pdf. 
 14  See Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, Exec. 
Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. 248 (2010); Establishing the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 
Exec. Order No. 13,632, 3 C.F.R. 328 (2013); Preparing the United States for the Impacts of 
Climate Change, Exec. Order No. 13,653, 3 C.F.R. 330 (2014); Establishing a Federal Flood Risk 
Management Standard and a Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input, 
Exec. Order No. 13,690, 80 Fed. Reg. 6,425 (Feb. 4, 2015), and Planning for Federal 
Sustainability in the Next Decade, Exec. Order No. 13,693, 80 Fed. Reg. 15,871 (Mar. 25, 2015). 
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Executive Order 13,514, issued on October 5, 2009, directed agencies to 
participate actively in the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task 
Force.15 In 2010, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued a task 
force progress report that called for adaptation based on science, integrated 
and risk-based approaches.16 CEQ subsequently issued instructions and a 
deadline for federal agencies to develop a climate adaptation plan.17 
After Congress failed to pass climate change legislation in 2010, 
President Obama began in earnest to assert his executive powers to promote 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. The enormous impact of 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012 further motivated climate resilience reform. 
Executive Order 13,632 created the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force 
and has enabled federal, state, and local actors to proceed with the recovery 
with an eye toward future climate change impacts.18 The Hurricane Sandy 
Task Force made several recommendations: 1) Facilitate the incorporation 
of future risk assessment, such as sea level rise, into rebuilding efforts with 
the development of a sea level rise tool; 2) develop a minimum flood risk 
reduction standard for major Federal investment that takes into account 
data on current and future flood risk; and 3) create a design competition to 
develop innovative resilient design solutions that address the Sandy-affected 
region’s most pressing vulnerabilities.19 
The task force’s work led to the development of shared federal 
resilience guidelines to govern Sandy-related infrastructure investment.20 
The Task Force specifically recommended more integrated and regional 
planning that will “promote better decision making, create more efficient 
and effective projects, and . . . avoid unintended impacts.”21 State and local 
stakeholders will be able to design more effective projects based on 
knowledge of other related investments, and the integrated and regional 
	
 15  Exec. Order No. 13,514, § 16, 3 C.F.R. 248, 258 (2010). This Executive Order was revoked 
by President Obama’s fifth executive order on this subject. Exec. Order No. 13,693, § 16(b), 80 
Fed. Reg. 15,871, 15,880. Because Executive Order 13,693 focuses on greenhouse gas emissions 
and energy efficiency, and does not address directly the issues around flooding and climate 
change adaptation, we do not discuss it in this Article. 
 16  COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION TASK FORCE: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF A NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION STRATEGY 9–10 (2010), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
microsites/ceq/Interagency-Climate-Change-Adaptation-Progress-Report.pdf. 
 17  COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION PLANNING IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 13514 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files 
/microsites/ceq/adaptation_final_implementing_instructions_3_3.pdf. 
 18  Exec. Order No. 13,632, 3 C.F.R. 328 (2013). The Executive Order charged the task force 
with identifying and removing “obstacles to resilient rebuilding in a manner that addresses 
existing and future risks and vulnerabilities and promotes the long-term sustainability of 
communities and ecosystems.” Id. § 3(c), at 329. 
 19  HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING STRATEGY: 
STRONGER COMMUNITIES, A RESILIENT REGION 43–47 (2013). 
 20  Id. at 49–83. 
 21  Id. at 54. 
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planning will reduce the “risk of unplanned redundancies or gaps in 
resilience.”22 
In response to the Task Force’s findings, President Obama’s next 
executive action, the Climate Action Plan (Plan), promotes climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.23 Executive Order 13,653 supplemented the Plan 
and required federal agencies to consider removing barriers to investment in 
climate change resilience as well as reforming policies that increase 
vulnerability to climate change related risks.24 Federal agencies also must 
identify opportunities to support state and local investment in resilience.25 
The 2014 Climate Data Initiative supports the Climate Action Plan by 
improving the reliability of information as well as access to information that 
can help private and public entities plan for resilience.26 The Climate Data 
Initiative also encourages entrepreneurs to develop more useful and 
accurate modeling.27 
On January 30, 2015, President Obama issued another flood-related 
Executive Order, 13,690, “Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management 
Standard and a Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder 
Input.”28 The Executive Order seeks “to improve the resilience of 
communities and Federal assets against the impacts of flooding . . . 
anticipated to increase over time due to the effects of climate change and 
other threats.”29 Executive Order 13,690 builds on and modifies President 
Carter’s 1977 Executive Order 11,988 by requiring federal agencies “to avoid 
direct or indirect support of floodplain development wherever there is a 
practicable alternative.”30 
Agencies must undertake a multipronged analysis prior to siting federal 
buildings in the floodplain.31 The new draft, flexible Federal Flood Risk 
Management standard provides a flexible approach for federal agencies to 
manage siting, design, and construction in the floodplain. Agencies may: 
	
 22  Id. 
 23  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 5 (2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan 
.pdf. 
 24  Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, Exec. Order No. 13,653, 
§ 2, 3 C.F.R. 330, 331 (2014). 
 25  Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, Fact Sheet: The President’s Climate Data 
Initiative (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/19/fact-sheet-
president-s-climate-data-initiative-empowering-america-s-comm (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 26  Id. 
 27  Id. 
 28  Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a Process for Further 
Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input, Exec. Order No. 13,690, 80 Fed. Reg. 6,425 (Feb. 
4, 2015). 
 29  Id. at 6,425. 
 30  Id. (modifying Floodplain Management, Exec. Order No. 11,988, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1978)). 
 31  FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DRAFT REVISED GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11,988, FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT 27–30 (2015), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1422653213069-9af488f43e1cf4a0a76ae870b2dcede9/ 
DRAFT-FFRMS-Implementating-Guidelines-1-29-2015r2.pdf. 
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(1)     Use data and methods informed by best available, actionable climate 
science; 
(2)    Build two feet above the 100-year (1%-annual-chance) flood elevation for 
standard projects, and three feet above for critical buildings like hospitals 
and evacuation centers; or 
(3)     Build to the 500-year (0.2%-annual-chance) flood elevation.32 
 
Executive Order 13,690 also requires federal agencies to use, when 
possible, “natural systems, ecosystem processes, and nature-based 
approaches” in developing alternatives to development in the floodplain.33 
The Executive Order is not intended to impact the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP), and does not require the modification of local floodplain 
ordinances adopted in conjunction with the NFIP.34 
The effectiveness of these climate reforms depends in large part on how 
the subject federal agencies respond to the call for changes. The next 
section discusses current agency action to implement the climate reforms. 
B. Federal Agency Implementation 
Based on these executive orders, federal agencies have started to 
evaluate policies relating to flood management and climate resilience. The 
CEQ has developed a guidance document for agencies as they prepare 
adaptation plans.35 Many agencies have crafted policies for integrating 
climate change adaptation into their operations.36 The United States Army 
Corps of Engineers (the Corps) has issued several reports addressing 
climate adaptation since 2013.37 The Corps’ North Atlantic Coast 
Comprehensive Study (NACCS) responded to the post-Sandy Disaster Relief 
Appropriations Act of 2013,38 which directed the Corps to “conduct . . . a 
	
 32  Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 4. 
 33  80 Fed. Reg. at 6,426. 
 34  See Chad Berginnis, Exec. Dir., Ass’n of State Floodplain Managers, Member and Partner 
Briefing on EO 13690 & The Federal Flood Risk Management Standard 16 (Feb. 10, 2015) (slides 
available at http://www.floods.org/ace-files/documentlibrary/FloodRiskMngmtStandard/FFRMS 
_Basics_Mbr_Briefing_2.10.2015_SLIDES.pdf.). The final implementation guidelines were issued 
in October 2015. Guidelines for Implementing Executive Order 11988, Floodplain Management, 
and Executive Order 13690, Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a 
Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,008 (Oct. 22, 
2015). 
 35  COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 17.  
 36  E.g., FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 8; U.S. ARMY 
CORPS OF ENG’RS, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PLAN (2014), available at http://www.usace. 
army.mil/Portals/2/docs/Sustainability/Performance_Plans/2014_USACE_Climate_Change_Adap
tation_Plan.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 100-K-14-001, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
PLAN (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/EPA-climate-change-
adaptation-plan.pdf. 
 37  See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, COASTAL RISK REDUCTION AND RESILIENCE (2013), 
available at http://www.swg.usace.army.mil/Portals/26/docs/PAO/Coastal.pdf; U.S. ARMY CORPS 
OF ENG’RS, SUPRA note 36; NACCS, supra note 8. 
 38  Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4. 
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comprehensive study to address the flood risks of vulnerable coastal 
populations in areas that were affected by Hurricane Sandy.”39 The NACCS 
report provides a risk management framework and supports coastal 
communities in efforts to consider future sea level and climate change 
scenarios.40 The Corps assesses vulnerability, or the inability to cope with 
adverse effects of coastal flooding, by analyzing the nature and magnitude of 
the hazard and the characteristics of the community.41 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), our disaster first 
responder, has encouraged local governments to integrate hazard 
mitigation42 analysis into land-use decisions.43 FEMA justified its expanded 
role in influencing local government action relating to disaster damages 
because: 1) hazard mitigation planning fits squarely in the local 
government’s role in protecting the welfare of the community, and 2) the 
economic benefits of proactively avoiding or minimizing risk through safe 
development practices outweigh the costs of damage and disruption.44 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also has 
been out front in its work with communities to improve the integration of 
hazard assessment into local planning. EPA has issued additional guidance 
and supported local efforts to engage in resilience planning that considers 
climate change.45 For instance, it has developed a resilience checklist for 
communities.46 
As the examples illustrate, agencies are moving forward in climate 
reforms within their purview. The reach of these agency-level changes will 
depend in part on how the changes fit into existing federal law related to 
flood management. 
III. EXISTING FEDERAL LAW RELATED TO FLOOD MANAGEMENT 
Without the support of the resistant Congress, the Obama 
Administration’s recent flood management reforms did not replace existing 
federal flood related laws, and thus, the interplay between the reforms and 
	
 39  Id. at 5. 
 40  NACCS, SUPRA note 8, at i. 
 41  Id. at 21. 
 42  The term “hazard mitigation” means “sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the 
long-term risk to human life and property from hazards.” 44 C.F.R. § 201.2 (2015). 
 43  FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, INTEGRATING HAZARD MITIGATION INTO LOCAL PLANNING: 
CASE STUDIES AND TOOLS FOR COMMUNITY OFFICIALS 1-1 (2013) [hereinafter FEMA INTEGRATING 
HAZARD MITIGATION INTO LOCAL PLANNING], available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1908-25045-0016/integrating_hazmit.pdf. 
 44  Id. at 2-1. 
 45  E.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LOCAL CLIMATE AND ENERGY PROGRAM MODEL DESIGN 
GUIDE: ENHANCING VALUE AND CREATING LASTING PROGRAMS (2015), available at 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/csc-ep-program-design-guide-13-
april-2015-508-v2.pdf.  
 46  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 231-R-14-003, PLANNING FOR FLOOD RECOVERY AND LONG-
TERM RESILIENCE IN VERMONT: SMART GROWTH APPROACHES FOR DISASTER-RESILIENT 
COMMUNITIES app. C (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-
07/documents/vermont-sgia-final-report.pdf. 
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existing law may determine the reforms’ success. Flood management is 
contained in several federal statutes and responsibility is distributed among 
a wide range of federal agencies. The lack of a unified and comprehensive 
legislation reflects a tension between local and federal control over resource 
management, and a longstanding unwillingness to accept the true risks 
involved in living near the water. 
The Corps had served as the lead flood control agency for decades, but 
its power declined beginning in the 1970s.47 The end of the “Big Dam Era”48 
and piecemeal funding moved the Corps’ work away from comprehensive 
planning and toward smaller, local flood control projects.49 Several other 
agencies—including FEMA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA)—play a substantial role in coastal flood 
management.50 
Three core federal statutes—the Coastal Zone Management Act 
(CZMA),51 the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA),52 and the National 
Flood Insurance Act53—along with the Corps’ flood control projects envision 
a three-pronged approach to flood protection. First, federal maps of 
vulnerable areas serve as the baseline for flood, hurricane and storm 
preparation.54 Second, federal subsidies, grants, and other funding soften 
federal obligations, and induce states and local governments to implement 
the programs.55 Third, federally subsidized flood insurance would ultimately 
transition to actuarial insurance.56 Sadly, these laws have largely failed to 
promote protective land-use decisions in vulnerable coastal areas. 
	
 47  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER RESOURCES 
INFRASTRUCTURE: DETERIORATION, INVESTMENT, OR DIVESTMENT? 24–25 (2012). 
 48  See generally JOHN R. FERRELL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, THE BIG DAM ERA: A 
LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM (1993) 
(discussing the Corps’ role in the construction and management of several large dams during 
the 20th century). 
 49  ASSOCIATED PROGRAMME ON FLOOD MANAGEMENT, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG. & GLOB. 
WATER P’SHIP, INTEGRATED FLOOD MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY USA: FLOOD MANAGEMENT - 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER 6–8 (2004), available at http://www.apfm.info/publications/casestudies/ 
cs_usa_mississippi_full.pdf. 
 50  See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Coastal Flood Risks: Achieving Resilience Together, 
https://www.fema.gov/coastal-flood-risks-achieving-resilience-together (last visited July 16, 
2016) (FEMA’s homepage for all resources and mapping related to its coastal flood management 
program); Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Digital Coast: Office of Coastal Management, 
https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/ (last visited July 16, 2016) (NOAA’s homepage for its coastal 
management program). 
 51  Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012). 
 52  Id. §§ 3501–3510. 
 53  National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012). 
 54  FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY & NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., PREPARING FOR 
HURRICANES AND COASTAL FLOODING: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS 4 (1983), available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-tc223-p74-1983/pdf/CZIC-tc223-p74-1983.pdf. 
 55  Id. at 105, 107–110. 
 56  FLOOD INS. SUBCOMM., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: PAST, PRESENT . . . AND FUTURE? 1–3 (2011), available at https://www.actuary.org/ 
files/publications/AcademyFloodInsurance_Monograph_110715.pdf.  
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Federal disaster and housing laws also impact flood management, 
because they provide another source of funding for flood-related 
improvements.57 These programs provide important incentives and 
guidelines for state and local governments, but the funding becomes 
available only after disasters.58 While the current federal flood regime 
influences state and local decision making, a closer look reveals that the 
federal programs do not do enough to support strong, risk-based local land-
use rules.59 
A. The Army Corps of Engineers’ Flood Control Efforts 
The Corps has not achieved integrated and effective flood management 
because the current funding structure has discouraged basin wide planning, 
reinforced the Corps’ longstanding reliance on hard structures, and allowed 
levees to fall into disrepair.60 
The Flood Control Act of 191761 cemented the Corps’ mission of flood 
management. The federal government began constructing levees, but it still 
turned them over to local interests for maintenance.62 In the late 1920s, in 
response to severe flooding on the Mississippi River, the federal government 
	
 57  Jennifer Wriggins, Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood Insurance Reform in a 
Warming World, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 361, 373, 382 (2014). 
 58  CAROLYN KOUSKY & LEONARD SHABMAN, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE REALITIES OF 
FEDERAL DISASTER AID 5 (2012), available at http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/ 
Download/RFF-IB-12-02.pdf. 
 59  See generally A. Dan Tarlock, Land Use Regulation: The Weak Link in Environmental 
Protection, 82 WASH. L. REV. 651, 654–55 (2007) (“During the formative period of environmental 
law in the now mythic 1960s, the expectation was that land would be subjected to 
comprehensive environmental regulation along with air and water. . . . From 1961–1969, the 
Department of Interior was run by one our greatest secretaries of Interior, Stewart Udall. . . . 
Secretary Udall’s 1964 book, The Quiet Crisis . . . set out to revive and adapt the public land-
focused conservation tradition to the new emerging, more comprehensive environmental 
consciousness.”). U.S. Senator Henry Jackson (R-Wash.) tried to legislate Secretary Udall’s 
vision. Id. at 656. In 1972, the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs issued a report, 
which criticized the delegation of state planning and regulatory to local governments. Id. In 
1973, the Committee reported out the National Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act, S. 
268, 93rd Cong. (1973). The bill fell to intense local and state opposition. Id. After its narrow 
defeat, all efforts for general federal land-use planning disappeared from the political scene 
never to reappear. Id. 
 60  John Flesher & Cain Burdeau, First Federal Flood-control Inspection Finds Flawed 
Levees Across U.S., DALL. MORNING NEWS, Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-
news/20130117-first-federal-flood-control-inspection-finds-flawed-levees-across-u.s..ece (last 
visited July 16, 2016) (Noting that inspectors took “the first-ever inventory of flood control 
systems overseen by the federal government have found hundreds of structures at risk of failing 
and endangering people and property in 37 states.”). No unified levee system exists and 85% are 
locally owned. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2013 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 23–
25 (2013), available at http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/documents/2013-Report-Card. 
pdf (grading the levee system as a “D-”). 
 61  Pub. L. No. 64-367, 39 Stat. 948. 
 62  CHRISTINE A. KLEIN & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MISSISSIPPI RIVER TRAGEDIES: A CENTURY OF 
UNNATURAL DISASTER 42–61 (2014) (tracing the Corps’ transition from disclaiming any 
responsibility for flood management to the 1917 which authorized federal levee construction). 
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took on increased responsibility for flood control; it also forced the Corps to 
move beyond its focus on levees toward river basin management through 
multipurpose water projects.63 Although the Corps began to shift away from 
its historic emphasis on levees, federal funding issues and failing hard 
structures have plagued its efforts at flood control. 
1. Funding Woes 
The entire notion of comprehensive river basin development died in the 
1970s. At the dawn of the environmental movement, Congress created a 
National Water Commission, the last serious attempt to craft a rational 
federal water resources policy.64 The Commission’s 1973 Report critiqued the 
lack of focus and coordination in federal water resources planning, which it 
essentially characterized as planning for planning’s sake.65 
Shortly after the 1973 Report, the funding mechanism for the Corps 
changed, which ultimately altered the nature of the Corps’ work. Periodic, 
omnibus Corps authorization bills rather than basin-wide project 
authorizations—called Water Resource Development Acts (WRDAs)—
became the funding mechanisms for the Corps.66 The Corps, accordingly, 
shifted away from major dam projects to small, local flood control projects.67 
The Corps has always required Congressional funding on a project-by-
project or program basis68 because it has no independent authority to 
propose and build projects.69 From 1986–2000, Congress passed a WRDA 
roughly every two years, but two seven-year gaps have occurred since 2000.70 
	
 63  See id. at 76–78 (explaining congressional authorization of reservoirs, spillways, and 
other structural flood control devices); see also Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, 
Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 
1486 (2007) (same). 
 64  See BETSY A. CODY & NICOLE T. CARTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40573, 35 YEARS OF 
WATER POLICY: THE 1973 NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION AND PRESENT CHALLENGES 1–5 (2009) 
(discussing the 1968–73 National Water Commission). 
 65  Id. at 8 (“The Commission found that budgeting procedures neither reflected nor 
promoted regional or long-term water resources development.”). 
 66  A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete Transition from the 
Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management Disaster Law, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151, 
175 (2012).  
 67  Id. More recently, these authorization statutes have been re-named “Water Resources 
Reform and Development Acts.” E.g., Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, 
Pub. L. No. 113-121, 128 Stat. 1193. 
 68  “Generally, about 85% of the appropriations for Corps civil works activities are directed 
to specific projects.” CARL E. BEHRENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42498, ENERGY AND WATER 
DEVELOPMENT: FY2013 APPROPRIATIONS 5 (2013). 
 69  NICOLE T. CARTER & CHARLES V. STERN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41243, ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS: WATER RESOURCE AUTHORIZATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, AND ACTIVITIES 1 (2016). The 
1986 WRDA cemented this disjointed approach and accepted the post-New Deal argument that 
small projects were only of local importance; local sponsors would share the costs, under a 
variety of cost-sharing formulas for new projects. NICOLE T. CARTER & BETSY A. CODY, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS20866, THE CIVIL WORKS PROGRAM OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS: A 
PRIMER 4–5 (2005). 
 70  CARTER & STERN, supra note 69, at 1. 
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Reliance on WRDAs has inhibited basin wide scale and regional flood 
control planning; as the Congressional Research Service has observed, “the 
appropriated funds for an individual study or project . . . [may be] 
insufficient to permit the optimum programming of work by the Corps.”71 
The most recent WRDA, the Water Resources Reform and Development 
Act of 2014,72 offers some positive features, but it also perpetuates piecemeal 
and ineffective flood management planning. On the plus side, it 1) authorized 
$50 million for the dissemination of flood information, 2) strengthened the 
levee inspection program,73 and 3) required a National Academy of Sciences 
study on ways to reduce risk to human life from extreme weather events in 
coastal areas including new infrastructure and coastal restoration options.74 
On the minus side, it relaxed the NEPA process for new projects, again 
discouraging regional flood control planning.75 
2. Failing Hard Structures 
Although the Corps had incorporated some upstream resource 
management tools in the middle of the 20th century, its overall approach has 
relied heavily on hard structures, such as dams and levees, for floodwater 
retention.76 Dams and levees have prevented millions of dollars of flood 
damages, but the illusion of safety created by the hard structures often led to 
risky development behind the structures.77 Dams and levees may actually 
increase flood damage when a serious flood occurs and the structures 
cannot contain it.78 Today, many of the nation’s levees are not constructed to 
deal with the 100-year flood, let alone the increased frequency and 
magnitude of floods associated with climate change.79 In 2010, the National 
Association of State Flood Plain Managers warned that, due to deteriorating 
levees, climate change, and federal budget priorities, “[w]e will soon enter 
an era of levee ‘triage’ – the process of prioritizing federal response to flood 
	
 71  NICOLE T. CARTER & H. STEVEN HUGHES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32064, ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS WATER RESOURCES ACTIVITIES: AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS 7 (2005). 
 72  Pub. L. No. 113-121, 128 Stat. 1193 (2014). 
73 Unfortunately, the levee inspection program has been slow to take off, mostly due to resource 
limitations. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-709, LEVEE SAFETY: ARMY CORPS AND 
FEMA HAVE MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN CARRYING OUT REQUIRED ACTIVITIES 1 (2016) “[T]he Corps 
has been working to develop a national levee inventory, but the agencies have taken no action 
on the remaining key national levee-safety-related activities for which they are responsible 
under the act.” Id. 
 74  § 1030(h), 128 Stat. at 1232; § 3016, 128 Stat. at 1289; § 3023, 128 Stat. at 1302. 
 75  NICOLE T. CARTER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43298, WATER RESOURCES REFORM AND 
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2014: COMPARISON OF SELECT PROVISIONS 7 (2014).  
 76  Chizewer & Tarlock, supra note 12, at 1749–50. Because the Corps historically focused 
on civil and military building, it often leaned heavily on this hard structure approach. See ORRIN 
H. PILKEY AND KATHARINE L. DIXON, THE CORPS AND THE SHORE 221–23 (1996). 
 77  Tarlock, supra note 66, at 166. 
 78  Id. 
 79  ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, NATIONAL FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT – LEVEE 
SAFETY COMPONENT 1 (2010). 
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risk associated with levees and rationing scarce federal dollars on multiple-
objective risk reduction projects.”80 
B. The National Flood Insurance Act 
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 was a bold, far sighted effort 
to guide development away from flood-prone areas and reducing taxpayer 
expenses associated with flood losses,81 but it has not achieved these goals. 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provides flood insurance to 
residents in high risk flood areas in exchange for local government land-use 
plans discouraging future development in these areas.82 Six catastrophic 
years, in which FEMA paid $1 billion or more, have severely impaired the 
financial stability of the program.83 Insufficient land-use requirements, 
outdated and inaccurate mapping, and reliance on an increasingly 
discredited 100-year flood model to set rates have contributed significantly 
to its ineffectiveness.84 
1. Outdated and Inaccurate Maps 
Effective floodplain management and insurance rates depend on state 
of the art, accurate maps. Unfortunately, FEMA has neither created accurate 
	
 80  Id. No unified levee system exists and 85% are locally owned. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 
supra note 60, at 23. 
 81  Section 1302 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 lays out important land-use 
goals for states and local governments: 1) Encourage state and local “land use adjustments to 
constrict the development of land” in flood-prone areas; 2) Guide development away from 
flood-prone areas; and 3) Encourage lending institutions to support the flood insurance 
objectives. Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1302(e), 82 Stat. 476, 573. In the spirit of discouraging 
development in the coastal flood zone, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 11988 
“to require federal agencies to avoid direct and indirect support of floodplain development in 
coastal velocity zones—the so-called V zones on Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMS)—by 
taking action ‘to reduce the risk of flood loss, to minimize the impact of floods on human safety, 
health and welfare, and to restore and preserve the natural and beneficial values served by 
floodplains in carrying out its responsibilities.’” RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42850, 
THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: STATUS AND REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 25 
(2013) (quoting Floodplain Management, Exec. Order No. 11,988, §1, 3 C.F.R. 117, 117 (1978)). 
 82  § 1302, 82 Stat. at 572–73. 
 83  KING, supra note 80, at 16–17. In addition, between 1978 and 2011, NFIP experienced nine 
loss years—i.e., loss payments exceeded premiums. Id. at 17. 
 84  The failings of the NFIP have been analyzed extensively. See infra notes 92–94; see, e.g., 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-297R, OVERVIEW OF GAO’S PAST WORK ON THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (2014) [hereinafter GAO-14-297R]; Erwann O. Michel-
Kerjan, Catastrophe Economics: The National Flood Insurance Program, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall, 
2010, at 165, 166 (pointing out the disconnect between actual risk and the current NFIP 
insurance premium structure); Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance 
Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 159–64 (1985) (analyzing the NFIP and making 
suggestions to improve its economic and political viability). Congress recognized that truly 
exceptional events would trigger the need for the program to borrow money from the federal 
government. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TYING FLOOD INSURANCE TO FLOOD 
RISK FOR LOW-LYING STRUCTURES IN THE FLOODPLAIN 10 (2015) [hereinafter TYING FLOOD 
INSURANCE TO FLOOD RISK]. 
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maps nor updated maps in a timely way.85 FEMA’s Flood Insurance Rate 
Maps (FIRMs or flood maps) determine whether property owners are in or 
out of a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA)—the “100-year flood” or 1% flood 
area86—and whether they require flood insurance.87 Flood maps factor in 
topographic surveys and information regarding river flow, storm tides, 
rainfall, and hydrologic/hydraulic analyses, and illustrate the floodplain 
boundaries.88 The communities that want to participate in the NFIP must 
enforce floodplain management regulations in these zones.89 For properties 
in these zones with a federally regulated or insured mortgage, flood 
insurance is mandatory.90 Residents living outside a SFHA, including 
residents living behind levees, are not required to obtain insurance.91 
FEMA has been notoriously slow in updating its maps and has not 
incorporated global climate change risk into its maps.92 Until 2003, FEMA 
	
 85  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MAPPING THE ZONE: IMPROVING FLOOD MAP 
ACCURACY, 19–20 (2009) [hereinafter NRC MAPPING THE ZONE]. The Risk Analysis Division of the 
Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, the FEMA division that manages NFIP, is 
responsible for mapping. FED. INS. & MITIGATION ADMIN., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FACT 
SHEET: FEDERAL INSURANCE AND MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION (2012), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1464356203875-13a7afa1f593a3f137f5855b784498fa/ 
FIMA_Overview_Fact_Sheet_2016r.pdf. 
 86  NRC MAPPING THE ZONE, supra note 84. The area subject to inundation in a 1% annual 
chance flood is the Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), and includes floodplains and coastal 
storm surge zones. Id. The 100-year flood is another name for the 1% flood, but it can mislead 
people into thinking it only happens once every 100 years. Id. The areas that lay within the high-
risk flood areas, SFHA, are designated as A, AE, V, or VE zones. 44 CFR § 59.1 (2015). The risk 
of flood reflects location and property characteristics such as “flood zone designation, elevation 
of the property relative to the community’s base flood elevation (BFE), building type, number of 
floors, presence of a basement, and the year the structure was built relative to the year of a 
community’s original flood map.” GAO-14-297R, supra note 83, at 16.  
 87  In written testimony to Congress, FEMA administrator Craig Fugate indicated that the 
“in or out” nature of the SFHAs creates a credibility problem. Examining the Reauthorization of 
the National Flood Insurance Program Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and 
Urban Affairs, 112 Cong. 43 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of W. Craig Fugate, 
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency). His statement implies that more 
should be done to recognize the gradation of risk within a flood zone. 
 88  GAO-14-297R, supra note 83, at 28, 30; see also FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
MANAGING FLOODPLAIN DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: HOME 
STUDY COURSE 3-18 (1998) [hereinafter FEMA HOME STUDY COURSE], available at 
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/floodplain/is_9_complete.pdf. 
 89  Once the community establishes these regulations, its residents are then eligible for 
insurance under NFIP. 44 C.F.R. § 59.2(b) (2015). See also FEMA HOME STUDY COURSE, supra 
note 87 at, 3-4, 5-4.  
 90  National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(a) (2012). 
 91  NICOLE T. CARTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42803, FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN FLOOD 
RESPONSE AND FLOOD INFRASTRUCTURE REPAIR: STORM SANDY RECOVERY 2 n.5 (2012) (“Notably 
absent from the reauthorization was mandatory flood purchase requirements for areas of 
residual risk—those areas that are protected by flood control measures (e.g., levees, dunes) but 
face flood risk if these measures are overwhelmed or fail.”). 
 92  Katherine Bagley, Climate Change Impacts Absent from FEMA’s Redrawn NYC Flood 
Maps, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS, Feb. 6, 2013, http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20130204/climate-
change-global-warming-flood-zone-hurricane-sandy-new-york-city-fema-federal-maps-revised-
sea-level-rise (last visited July 16, 2016). 
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largely relied on flood maps prepared in the 1970s and 1980s.93 In 2003, 
FEMA began the digitization and improvement of its maps, planning to adopt 
a risk-based approach and improve standards and guidance.94 In 2008, 
however, 50% of the nation’s maps were at least 15 years old and 70% were at 
least 5 years old.95 
Although FIRMs have been sorely out of date and inaccurate in their 
delineation of the floodplain, some more recent technological advances 
promise to improve map accuracy. In 2009, FEMA began using the Risk MAP 
program to enhance mapping through “visual illustration of flood risk, 
analysis of the probability of flooding, economic consequences of flooding.”96 
Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) can provide more accurate flood maps 
because it gathers 3D information.97 LIDAR employs a remote sensing 
method that uses light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure ranges to the 
Earth.98 The expense of LIDAR technology has limited its use,99 but the 
Obama Administration recently has shown an increased commitment to 
	
 93  Al Shaw, Theodoric Meyer & Christie Thompson, Federal Flood Maps Left New York 
Unprepared for Sandy—and FEMA Knew It, PROPUBLICA, Dec. 6, 2013, 
http://www.propublica.org/article/federal-flood-maps-left-new-york-unprepared-for-sandy-and-
fema-knew-it (last visited July 16, 2016). More than 70% of the maps were at least 10 years old: 
“many maps no longer accurately reflected current flood hazards.” Hearing, supra note 86, at 33 
(statement of W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency). 
 94  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-17, FEMA FLOOD MAPS: SOME STANDARDS AND 
PROCESSES IN PLACE TO PROMOTE MAP ACCURACY AND OUTREACH, BUT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO 
ADDRESS IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 1–2 (2010). The National Research Council noted in its 
2009 assessment, however, that FEMA’s map modernization project only resulted in 21% of the 
population having maps that meet the standards; the incomplete effort cost $1 billion dollars. 
NRC MAPPING THE ZONE, supra note 84, at 1. Note that they covered 65% of the country that 
contained 92 percent of the population. Theodoric Meyer, Why So Many Flood Maps Are Still 
Out of Date, PROPUBLICA, July 8, 2013, http://www.propublica.org/article/why-so-many-flood-
maps-are-still-out-of-date (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 95  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-12, FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA’S RATE-SETTING 
PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION 18 (2008). 
 96  Hearing, supra note 86, at 33 (statement of W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Fed. 
Emergency Mgmt. Agency); FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, WHAT IS RISK MAP? (2012), 
available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1731-25045-8364/what_is_risk_ 
map_factsheet_07_19_12.pdf.  
 97  Patrick Marshall, USGS Chips Away at High-Res 3D Map of the United States, GCN, Aug. 
29, 2014, https://gcn.com/Articles/2014/08/29/USGS-3D-Lidar-Map.aspx (last visited July 16, 
2016); Meyer, supra note 93. 
 98  An airplane flies over the area in question and uses the LIDAR to fire laser pulses in a 
beam that hit the ground and bounce back to the airplane, which generates data “about 10 times 
more accurate than old data.” Meyer, supra note 93. 
 99  See Shaw, Meyer & Thompson, supra note 92 (discussing the expense of updating maps 
with new technology). 
  “Some states have considered the need for better maps as so urgent that they took it 
upon themselves to gather the data. North Carolina decided to pay for mapping the state 
using LIDAR after Hurricane Floyd in 1999: ‘We were concerned at the time that FEMA 
didn’t have the money,’ said John Dorman, the director of the North Carolina Floodplain 
Mapping Program.”  
Id. 
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technologically improved maps.100 As part of the 3D Elevation initiative, the 
Department of the Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey and other federal 
agencies will partner to develop advanced 3D mapping data.101 This data will 
help with flood risk management, mitigation of coastal erosion, and storm 
surge impacts.102 
While FEMA has begun to improve its maps, problems persist. First, the 
mapping process remains very time-consuming. In the New York-New Jersey 
area, FEMA began a study to update coastal storm surge elevations in 2009, 
refined the maps after Hurricane Sandy, but the preliminary maps were not 
issued until January 30, 2015.103 New York City has since filed a technical 
appeal of FEMA’s preliminary maps which is still under review.104 Second, 
complaints continue to emerge regarding the accuracy of the new maps with 
89% of the 30,000 flood map amendment requests proving successful.105 
Third, the usefulness of the maps suffered from FEMA’s lack of authority to 
	
 100  See Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, Fact Sheet: Taking Action to Support 
State, Local, and Tribal Leaders as They Prepare Communities for the Impacts of Climate 
Change (July 16, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/16/fact-sheet-taking 
-action-support-state-local-and-tribal-leaders-they-pre (last visited July 16, 2016) (discussing 
President Obama responding to guidance from community leaders and federal agency action 
directed at developing advanced mapping data and tools). 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id.; see also U.S. Geological Survey, 3D Elevation Program, http://nationalmap.gov/3DEP/ 
(last visited July 16, 2016) (explaining that FEMA expects this project to reduce the time needed 
for updating maps and provide better information). This project is encouraging because funding 
for mapping had actually declined in recent years. Theodoric Meyer, As Need for New Flood 
Maps Rises, Congress and Obama Cut Funding, PROPUBLICA, May 24, 2013, http://www.propub 
lica.org/article/as-need-for-new-flood-maps-rises-congress-and-obama-cut-funding (last visited 
July 16, 2016). In a 2013 series after Hurricane Sandy, journalist Theodoric Meyer noted that 
“Congress has cut funding for updating flood maps by more than half since 2010, from $221 
million down to $100 million this year. And the president’s latest budget request would slash 
funding for mapping even further to $84 million — a drop of 62 percent over the last four years.” 
Id.; see also KING, supra note 80, at 16–18. 
 103  FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PRELIMINARY FLOOD INSURANCE STUDY NUMBER 
360497V000B 21 (2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/downloads/pdf/360497NY-
New-York-City.pdf (using the Advanced Circulation Model for Oceanic, Coastal and Estuarine 
Waters (ADCIRC) for stimulation of 2-dimensional hydrodynamics as well as the unstructured 
numerical wave model Simulating Waves Nearshore). Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Region II 
Coastal Analysis and Mapping: Preliminary Flood Maps & Data, http://www.region2coastal. 
com/view-flood-maps-data/view-preliminary-flood-map-data (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 104  Corinne Ramey, New York Disputes FEMA on Flood Risk, WALL STREET J., Aug. 18 2015, 
http://on.wsj.com/290VBHq (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 105  Miranda Leitsinger, For Average Joes, Fighting FEMA Flood Maps Isn’t Easy or Cheap, 
NBC NEWS, Feb. 20, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/average-joes-fighting-fema-
flood-maps-isnt-easy-or-cheap-n23871 (last visited July 16, 2016). In several instances, new maps 
place homeowners in flood zones even though they are located at the top of a hill or nowhere 
near water. Id. In rural areas, digitization of maps may represent a matching of old lines and 
available engineering studies. Theodoric Meyer, Using Outdated Data, FEMA is Wrongly Placing 
Homeowners in Flood Zones, PROPUBLICA, July 18, 2013, http://www.propublica.org/ 
article/using-outdated-data-fema-is-wrongly-placing-homeowners-in-flood-zones (last visited 
July 16, 2016) (explaining that the superimposition of modern satellite imagery on old maps 
often results in a “warping” effect that can erroneously show that homes on high ground are in 
the flood hazard area).  
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consider climate change’s impacts, including rising sea levels, when 
updating flood maps.106 Fortunately, the Biggert-Waters Act107 has encouraged 
FEMA to incorporate climate change’s likely impacts in its planning.108 
2. Insufficient Land-Use Requirements 
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 instructs FEMA to “develop 
comprehensive criteria . . . [for] State and local measures . . . [to] constrict 
the development [in flood-prone areas.]”109 Communities that want their 
residents to qualify for the NFIP must promulgate minimum land-use 
regulations in compliance with NFIP regulations.110 These NFIP regulations 
focus on prescribing building standards to minimize flood damage and apply 
to all new structures located in a SFHA. The building standards generally 
have reduced flood damage compared to structures built without the 
building standards.111 But these standards neither incorporate changing 
	
 106  GAO-14-297R, supra note 83, at 18, 37. 
 107  Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405, 
924.  
 108  § 100215, 126 Stat. at 924 (requiring the Technical Mapping Advisory Council (TMAC) to 
review a flood mapping program with technically credible flood hazard data before the 
Administrator can implement it). Note that FEMA has not yet established the TMAC, which is 
responsible for the report. See GAO-14-297R, supra note 83, at 30–31, 37 (the Act required 
FEMA to reestablish TMAC and for TMAC to produce reports with recommendations regarding 
the best available climate science and the best available methodology to consider the impact of 
rising sea levels, but TMAC only existed from 1995-2000, and even after the deadline for TMAC’s 
report on July 6, 2013, TMAC had not been reestablished). 
 109  Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1302, 82 Stat. 476, 587 (1968). This language stems from the 
increased acceptance of Gilbert White’s views. In 1945, Gilbert White’s seminal thesis raised 
important concerns regarding the repeated failure of levees and other structures and the 
creation of a moral hazard situation for people living in flood-prone areas. Gilbert F. White, 
Human Adjustment to Floods, in 1 GEOGRAPHY, RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF GILBERT F. WHITE 10, 12–13, 22–23 (Robert W. Kates and Ian Burton eds., 1986). 
 110  FEMA HOME STUDY COURSE, supra note 87, at 5-6. Structures must be designed and 
anchored to prevent flotation and collapse, constructed with materials below the Base Flood 
Elevation (BFE) that are flood resistant, designed to minimize flood damage, and enclosed 
spaces below the BFE can only be used for building access, parking, and storage. CHRISTOPHER 
JONES ET AL., AM. INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM’S BUILDING STANDARDS 2–3 (2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1602-20490-5110/nfip_eval_building_standards.pdf. The subset of homes within 
the SFHA that are in the V zone, or subject to wave velocity, must also meet the following 
requirements: (1) lowest floor must be at or above the BFE, (2) open foundations to allow 
floodwater to pass beneath elevated buildings, (3) any enclosures below the BFE must have 
screening, lattice, or breakaway walls, and (4) the building and its foundation must resist 
flotation, collapse or lateral displacement. Id. at 3–4. 
 111  JONES ET AL., supra note 109, at viii. 
  Not all NFIP insurance provisions and premium rates promote better construction, 
however[,] Rogers (2005) has documented one scenario where the NFIP premium rate 
structure discourages a building practice, which reduces storm damage to structures. 
Many reports promote the use of pole-type construction, where the pilings extend from 
in the ground, past the lowest floor and to a higher floor or to the roofline. In situation 
where pole-type construction is used, the buildings sometimes are penalized by the NFIP 
through increased flood premiums and/or reduced flood policy coverage for the 
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conditions112 nor protect against floods of a magnitude greater than the  
100-year flood.113 
NFIP has motivated flood prevention land-use regulation, but it also has 
allowed local governments to reinforce moral hazard behavior.114
 
Most local 
governments have not maximized floodplain management under the NFIP. 
NFIP only requires cities to address its land-use requirements within a 
SFHA;115
 
this limited scope disincentivizes more comprehensive local flood 
mitigation strategies.116 
The NFIP’s Community Rating System (CRS) ideally incentivizes 
communities to adopt stronger standards in exchange for reduced flood 
insurance premiums for their residents.117 The CRS “encourage[s] a 
comprehensive approach to floodplain management” through a point 
system.118 Communities receive credit points for 18 activities that relate to 
	
structure and contents between the lowest floor and the floor at the top of the pilings. 
The effect of this “piling penalty” has been to encourage builders and owners to 
terminate piling foundations at the BFE, even though continuing the pilings upward to a 
higher floor results in buildings which better resist flood and wind damage. In cases 
where flood levels have exceeded the BFE, buildings with the pilings terminating at the 
BFE have experienced far greater damage than buildings with pilings extending to a 
higher floor. 
Id. at 10. 
 112  Id. at viii. 
 113  Id. at ix; see also NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, HEAVY RAINFALL AND INCREASED FLOODING RISK: 
GLOBAL WARMING’S WAKE-UP CALL FOR THE CENTRAL UNITED STATES (2008), available at 
https://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/Water/2008_HeavyRainfallandIncreasedFlooding_Report.as
hx. 
 114  Chizewer & Tarlock, supra note 12, at 1760 n.116 (alteration in original) (“The reasons lie 
deep in the human psyche. The recent Congressional Research Service report observed that 
‘[b]ehavioral scientists have noted that many individuals in flood-prone areas often dismiss low-
probability catastrophic events, misunderstand the risk spreading function of insurance, and 
tend to be optimistic regarding the prospects of damage to their property.’” (quoting KING, supra 
note 80, at 3)). New Orleans is a classic example. After Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans officials 
successfully pressured FEMA to include the protection afforded by the federal government’s 
$14.5 billion flood control system in its flood maps. Property owners in many below sea-level 
areas no longer need flood insurance. However, “the new maps do not adequately highlight the 
shifting reality wrought by climate change.” Andy Horowitz, Opinion, Could New Orleans Flood 
Again?, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2016, at A21. 
 115  Id. at 1762 (citing THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES: HISTORY, 
DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY 78 (2003)). Each year the agency issues thousands of 
Letters of Map Change that often constrict previously mapped floodplain boundaries. Id. at 
1763. 
 116  WILL HEWES & ANDREW FAHLUND, AM. RIVERS, WEATHERING CHANGE: POLICY REFORMS 
THAT SAVE MONEY AND MAKE COMMUNITIES SAFER 6 (2011), available at http://www.cakex.org/ 
sites/default/files/weathering-change-full-report.pdf.  
 117  42 U.S.C. § 4022(b) (2012). See also Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, Managing the 
Next Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 9 (2011) 
(discussing the level of community participation in the CRS). 
 118  Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Community Rating System, 
https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/crs/community_rating_system.jsp (last visited 
July 16, 2016). The CRS also aims to “reduce flood damage to insurable property . . . [and] 
strengthen and support the insurance aspects of the NFIP.” Id.; see ANN KILLIUS, VA. COASTAL 
POLICY CLINIC, SEA LEVEL RISE, STORMWATER MANAGEMENT AND THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
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mapping, damage reduction, preparedness and public information.119 
Currently, 1,368 communities, representing 68% of policyholders, participate 
in the CRS.120 The CRS has the potential to improve local planning, but it is a 
voluntary program and the benefits inure to the local residents as opposed 
to the municipalities. 
C. Coastal Management Law and Flood Control 
For coastal areas susceptible to increased flooding caused by sea level 
rise and extreme weather events, the CZMA and the CBRA theoretically 
offer an opportunity to keep citizens out of harm’s way. Both statutes 
purport to check risky development along the coast, but both have fallen 
short in preventing moral hazard behavior. They have provided sufficient 
discretion for states and local governments determined to move ahead with 
flood-prone development. Both statutes remain potentially helpful to 
advance the goals of the climate resilience reforms. 
1. Coastal Zone Management Act 
The CZMA selectively superimposes federal law over state and local 
land-use decisions.121 The CZMA is the oldest federal program designed to 
check unlimited coastal development and to preserve the natural resiliency 
of coastal ecosystems.122 The CZMA tried to solve problems caused by 
fragmented and local control over coastal regions, or the preference of local 
governments’ interests over the state and federal goals.123 The CZMA’s design 
reflects the desire to develop a more integrated approach to coastal 
	
PROGRAM: HOW NORFOLK’S BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES CAN LOWER LOCAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
RATES 6 (2013) (explaining the CRS point system), available at 
http://law.wm.edu/academics/programs/jd/electives/clinics/vacoastal/documents/march2014rep
orts/sealevelrise.pdf. 
 119  KILLIUS, supra note 117, at 6. 
 120  FED. INS. & MITIGATION ADMIN., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: COMMUNITY 
RATING SYSTEM (2015), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1444399187441-
5293d81167caaf062c2925b75a69215f/NFIP_CRS_Fact_Sheet-Oct-8-2015.pdf. 
 121  Cellular towers are another exception where federal regulatory programs were 
selectively superimposed over state and local land-use decisions. Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 704, 110 Stat. 56, 151–52 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) 
(2012)). There is no comprehensive federal program of “sensitive land” protection. Activities 
such as the filling of a wetland or development in the critical habitat of a listed endangered 
species require a federal permit in addition to compliance with all state and local regulations. 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012) (“The Secretary may issue 
permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill 
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”); Endangered Species Act of 
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (specifying that the Secretary can issue permits for 
takings). 
 122  Section 302(c) of the CZMA acknowledges that intensive development has caused the 
loss of living marine resources, adverse impacts on coastal ecosystems and shoreline erosion. 
CZMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012). 
 123  Barton H. Thompson, Jr., A Federal Act to Promote Integrated Water Management: Is the 
CZMA a Useful Model?, 42 ENVTL. L. 201, 219 (2012). 
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management that would protect federal interests, while recognizing the 
importance of state autonomy.124 
The voluntary program provides planning grants to states to develop 
coastal zone management programs and mandates federal consistency with 
state approved plans.125 In exchange for adopting plans for coastal areas, 
states can deny development authority and licenses to federal activities if 
they are inconsistent with the state’s program.126 
The CZMA’s biggest weakness is that it does not mandate any particular 
set of elements. Section 309 does, however, encourage states to undertake 
enhancement projects across certain key areas: “wetlands, coastal hazards, 
public access, marine debris, cumulative and secondary impacts, special 
area management plans, ocean and Great Lakes resources, energy and 
government facility siting, and aquaculture.”127 In June 2014, NOAA amended 
its section 309 guidance to ensure greater consideration of climate change 
challenges in coastal management; state coastal plans must address coastal 
flooding as a result of sea level rise.128 NOAA also will make $1.5 million of 
competitive funding available to help states and tribes make improvements 
to their coastal management programs.129 The guidance will help state and 
tribal coastal managers better prepare for the impacts of climate change and 
improve the safety of their communities. 
2. Coastal Barrier Resources Act 
The CBRA, adopted in 1982, employs a creative approach to coastal 
protection. It prohibits federal funding for development in designated 
coastal areas, based on the recognition that the federal government 
historically had permitted and subsidized development that resulted in “the 
loss of barrier resources, threats to human life, health, and property, and the 
expenditure of millions of tax dollars each year.”130 
To prevent further damage, the CBRA requires the mapping of coastal 
barriers131 and prohibits certain development and many types of federal 
	
 124  CZMA could have been integrated into a general, federal land-use planning program, but 
instead the United States has carved up its land base into a series of private, exclusive 
entitlements, exercised limited federal control to retained public lands, and enshrined the idea 
that land should be controlled at the lowest level of government, if at all. See BRIAN W. 
BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION § 8:42–44 (2014 ed.) 
(describing the state programs for local regulations for managing coastal land uses). 
 125  See Thompson, supra note 122, at 219–20. 
 126  16 U.S.C. § 1456(d)(11)(C) (2012). 
 127  NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT SECTION 309 
PROGRAM GUIDANCE 1 (2014), available at https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/media/Sect-309_Guidance_ 
June2014.pdf.  
 128  Id. at 23–25. 
 129  Exec. Office of the President, supra note 99. 
 130  CBRA, 16 § 3501(a)(4) (2012). 
 131  Id. § 3503(f). Barrier is defined as a “depositional geologic feature” subject to “wave, 
tidal, and wind energies, and protects landward aquatic habitats from direct wave attack.” Id. 
§ 3502(1)(A). 
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expenditures in these protected areas.132 The types of prohibited federal 
expenses vary widely from financing or undertaking construction of roads 
and airports providing access to Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS) 
areas, to federal flood insurance, to emergency operations.133 The CBRA does 
not prohibit privately funded development, but rather hopes that without the 
federal support developers will be deterred. The Act initially “designated 186 
units, comprising about 453,000 acres along 666 miles of shoreline from 
Maine to Texas,” and now includes 585 units and 1.3 million acres.134 
The CBRA is a model for curbing moral hazard behavior in at-risk areas, 
because it has succeeded in saving significant federal dollars, according to 
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).135 These savings stem 
from averted disaster relief costs as well as construction costs.136 FWS also 
notes, however, “[w]here the economic incentive for development is 
extremely high, the Act’s funding limitations can be overcome.”137 Indeed, ten 
years after CBRA’s enactment, a General Accountability Office (GAO) 
Report determined that the program largely failed because 9 of the 34 CBRS 
units had undergone significant new development with more development 
planned.138 In 2007, the GAO did a follow-up report and determined that even 
with limited federal financial assistance, in areas conducive and attractive to 
development, state or local governments that want the development provide 
their own subsidies.139 Agencies also might have had difficulty determining 
	
 132  Id. § 3504. The Coastal Barrier Improvement Act of 1990 (CBIA), Pub. L. No. 101-591, 104 
Stat. 2931 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 3503 (2012)) expanded the Coastal Barrier 
Resources System (CBRS) to include undeveloped coastal barriers along the Florida Keys, 
Great Lakes, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands. § 3, 104 Stat. at 2931. The CBIA also created a 
new category of coastal barriers called “otherwise protected areas” (OPAs), which are held and 
managed a qualified organization, primarily for wildlife refuge, sanctuary, recreational, or 
natural resource conservation purposes. § 12, 104 Stat. at 2940; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., CBRA 
Legislation and Testimony, http://www.fws.gov/ecological-services/habitat-conservation/cbra/ 
Act/Legislation.html (last visited July 16, 2016) (explaining the changes made by Congress via 
the CBIA). 
 133  44 C.F.R. § 206.344 (2015). Exceptions to this limit are made for energy exploration, 
emergency assistance, and repair of existing roads. Id. § 206.345. 
 134  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-356, COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES SYSTEM: 
STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT THAT HAS OCCURRED AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY FEDERAL 
AGENCIES 7 (2007) [hereinafter GAO-07-356]. 
 135  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES ACT: HARNESSING THE 
POWER OF MARKET FORCES TO CONSERVE AMERICA’S COASTS AND SAVE TAXPAYERS’ MONEY 1–3 
(2002) (estimating a savings from 1983 through 1996 of about $686,000,000), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/cbra/Docs/TaxpayerSavingsfromCBRA.pdf. 
 136  Id. at 2. 
 137  Id. at 4. 
 138  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED 92-115, COASTAL BARRIERS: DEVELOPMENT 
OCCURRING DESPITE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, 24–25 (1992). The report also 
noted that, “[f]or example, the CBRS unit in North Bethany Beach, Delaware, contained only 
two single-family residences in 1982. From October 1, 1983, to October 1, 1990, the number of 
such residences that have received permits increased to 74. If the development currently 
planned occurs, the number of residences will eventually increase to 81. Two of the 10 federal 
agencies GAO contacted on the issue of financial assistance provided such assistance within the 
CBRS contrary to CBRA’s prohibitions.” Id. at 3–4. 
 139  GAO-07-356, supra note 133, at 14. 
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whether the properties in question were within the CBRS based on mapping 
problems.140 
The ability to deter development in the CBRS depends significantly on 
the state and local attitudes toward these lands.141 The CBRA experience 
only reinforces the need for state and local collaboration with the federal 
program or willingness to impose more stringent floodplain controls.142 
D. Disaster and Housing Law and Flood Control 
The intersection of flood control law and disaster law provides another 
opportunity for local governments to proactively manage increased flood 
risks.143 Disaster law historically focused on post-disaster relief, but now 
includes prevention and damage mitigation.144 
1. Hazard Mitigation Planning 
The Stafford Disaster Act145 established a framework for states and local 
governments to engage in adaptive planning to reduce damages associated 
with natural disasters.146 The Stafford Act requires states to submit Hazard 
Mitigation Plans for FEMA approval and then incentivizes states to act by 
issuing hazard mitigation plan grants.147 Hazard mitigation is defined as 
“sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to human 
life and property from hazards.”148 
As of 2013, 25,000 communities have submitted hazard mitigation 
plans.149 The hazard mitigation plans include a risk assessment of natural 
hazards,150 which can encompass consideration of climate change. Soon, 
however, states may be required to build climate change impacts into these 
hazard mitigation plans.151 
FEMA has the authority to fund hazard mitigation activities, which it 
defines as “[a]ny cost effective measure which will reduce the potential for 
	
 140  Id. at 17–18. Much like the FEMA maps, the CBRA maps have been inaccurate and/or 
confusing—where adjacent homes may not be treated in kind. The 2000 reauthorization of the 
CBRA included funding for digital mapping. pilot project. Coastal Barrier Resources 
Reauthorization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-514, § 6, 114 Stat. 2394, 2396. 
 141  KLEIN & ZELLMER, supra note 62, at 1530. 
 142  Id. at 1529–30. 
 143  See ERNEST B. ABBOTT ET AL., STATE, LOCAL, AND FIRST RESPONDER ISSUES (2006), 
reprinted in DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 79 
(2006). 
 144  FARBER & CHEN, supra note 142, at 102–03, 201. 
 145  Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2012).  
 146  Id. § 5121. 
 147  Id. §§ 5165–5165a. 
 148  44 C.F.R. § 201.2 (2015). 
 149  FEMA INTEGRATING HAZARD MITIGATION INTO LOCAL PLANNING, supra note 43, at 1-2. 
 150  Id. at 5-1. 
 151  Exec. Office of the President, supra note 99; see also infra notes 196 and 197 and 
accompanying text.  
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damage to a facility from a disaster event.”152
 
Some structural flood control 
projects are eligible.153 Efforts to move citizens out of harm’s way—property 
acquisition and elevation requirements/changes—are also included. 
Vegetative management and stormwater management—system-wide 
projects—can qualify for funding.154 State and local governments must 
contribute 25% of the costs.155 
The Hazardous Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) provides an 
important source of funding for flood management, but the current structure 
has not encouraged planning for climate change. Hazard mitigation grant 
applicants must prove that the project is cost-effective.156 FEMA’s cost-
effectiveness calculation requires that the problem be “repetitive” and relies 
on historical data such as FIRMs, but it does not consider “the long-term 
changes in flood risks from sea-level rise and climate change.”157 This 
approach inherently discourages forward looking planning. Because the 
current HMGP structure gives the money to the states, which then distribute 
the money to the local government sub grantees, local governments are 
competing within each state for funding and must manage another layer of 
bureaucracy.158 
A 2013 FEMA report recognizes that state and local governments have 
typically not integrated their hazard mitigation plans with other local 
plans.159 The report emphasizes the importance of integrating hazard 
mitigation planning with other community planning to achieve greater 
resilience.160 It also gives local governments strategies for incorporating this 
information into planning and provides case studies.161 Effective March 2016, 
	
 152  44 C.F.R. § 206.2(14) (2015); see NICOLE SMITH & JESSICA GRANNIS, UNDERSTANDING THE 
ADAPTATION PROVISIONS OF THE SANDY DISASTER RELIEF APPROPRIATIONS ACT (H.R. 152), 
(Discussion Draft 2013), available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/www.georgetown 
climate.org/files/GCC_Sandy_Relief_Act_Analysis.pdf 
 153  44 C.F.R. § 206.434(c)(2) (2015). See SMITH & GRANNIS, supra note 151 at 14 n.73 (noting 
that seawall construction is an eligible cost). 
 154  SMITH & GRANNIS, supra note 151 at 14. 
 155  “The President may contribute up to 75 percent of the cost of hazard mitigation 
measures which the President has determined are cost-effective and which substantially reduce 
the risk of future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering in any area affected by a major disaster.” 
Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a) (2012). 
 156  44 C.F.R. § 206.434(c)(5) (2015). 
 157  See SMITH & GRANNIS, supra note 151 at 14–15. 
 158  See CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC: A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 404 (2013) (allowing 
nonprofit hospitals to apply directly to the State of New York for section 404, 42 U.S.C. § 5170c 
(2012), funding in order to circumvent some bureaucracy).  
 159  FEMA INTEGRATING HAZARD MITIGATION INTO LOCAL PLANNING, supra note 43, at 2-2. 
 160  Id. at 2-1. 
 161  Id. For examples of local governments incorporating those strategies, see, e.g., Robert 
R.M. Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting to Climate Change While Planning for Disaster: Footholds, 
Rope Lines, and the Iowa Floods, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2203, 2235–49 (2011) (describing an EPA-led 
project in Iowa, which promoted the consideration of climate change in hazard mitigation 
plans); Chizewer & Tarlock, supra note 12, at 1768–91 (reviewing local and regional flood 
damage prevention programs). 
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state mitigation plans must take into consideration climate change 
impacts.162 
2. Community Development Block Grants 
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,163 administered 
by Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides another source for 
state and local post-flood recovery efforts—the Community Development 
Block Grants (CDBG).164 After a disaster, Congress provides supplemental 
appropriations to HUD,165 which then uses the CBDG program to meet 
“community development needs having a particular urgency because 
existing conditions pose a serious and immediate threat to the health or 
welfare of the community.”166 The CDBG funds supplement assistance under 
the Stafford Act.167 As explained by HUD, “[t]hese communities must have 
significant unmet recovery needs and the capacity to carry out a disaster 
recovery program (usually these are governments that already receive 
[HOME Investment Partnership Program (HOME)] or CDBG allocations).”168 
Further, “fifty percent of the funds must support persons of low or moderate 
income, unless the Secretary waives this requirement based upon a finding 
of compelling need.”169 
State and local government grantees have substantial discretion in 
using the funds and can use the money “to acquire real property, demolish 
structures, prepare sites for development, to establish revolving funds, and 
	
 162  FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FP 302-094-2, STATE MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW GUIDE 13 
(2015) [hereinafter  FEMA FP 302-094-2], available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1425915308555-aba3a873bc5f1140f7 
320d1ebebd18c6/State_Mitigation_Plan_Review_Guide_2015.pdf. 
 163  42 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5321 (2012). 
 164  SMITH & GRANNIS, supra note, 151 at 15–16. 
 165  Id. at 16. In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, Congress appropriated $16 billion to the CDBG 
program. Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4, 36. That 
number was reduced to $15.1 billion through the sequestration process. See Third Allocation, 
Waivers, and Alternative Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block 
Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG–DR) Funds in Response to Disasters Occurring in 2013, 80 
Fed. Reg. 1,039, 1,039 (Jan. 8, 2015) (discussing sequestration process). In its allocations of 
funding for the post-Sandy relief, HUD set expectations: “For the disasters covered by this 
Notice, HUD has required that grantees use their funds in a way that results in rebuilding back 
stronger so that future disasters do less damage and recovery can happen faster.” Id. at 1,043. 
 166  SMITH & GRANNIS, supra note 151, at 16 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 570.200(a)(2) (2013)). This is 
one of the three national priorities that must be meet by CDBG-funded activities; the other two 
priorities include 1) benefit low- and moderate-income families, or 2) aid in the prevention or 
elimination of slums or blight. Id. at 15–16. 
 167  Id. at 17. 
 168  U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Dev., HUD Exchange: CBDG-DR Eligibility Requirements, 
https://www.hudexchange.info/cdbg-dr/cdbg-dr-eligibility-requirements (last visited July 16, 
2016). 
 169  SMITH & GRANNIS, supra note 151, at 16. 
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to support economic development, among other things.”170
 
Local 
governments can use the money to mitigate future hazards.171 
The availability of support from the federal government through the 
CBDG and HMGP programs can help a local government move from disaster 
to forward looking planning, but these programs lack the breadth and depth 
needed to obtain the full level of change needed. The financial constraints on 
the Corps’ ability to plan on the larger scale also hinder integrated 
management. The NFIP has improved modestly, but it does not provide 
sufficient disincentives to moral hazard behavior. Considering that no 
sweeping legislative changes will happen in the near future, we must 
consider whether the climate reforms can provide an effective solution. 
IV. WILL CLIMATE RESILIENCE REFORMS IMPROVE FEDERAL FLOOD 
MANAGEMENT? 
The Obama Administration’s climate resilience reforms, if fully 
implemented by the governing federal agencies, will move federal flood 
management toward an integrated and risk-based approach based on climate 
science. The executive directives have happened at a time when no reforms 
with the word “climate” could make their way through Congress. They 
promote innovative solutions and encourage planning based on improved 
climate data to help analyze sea level rise and other key indicators.172 They 
call for land-use and other local planning that considers hazard mitigation 
and provide incentives for local governments to take action. 
Will the reforms repair a broken flood management system? Although 
the reforms should improve flood management, they do not make the system 
whole because they are executive actions, they do not replace existing 
federal laws, and they may not provide another financial or structural 
support for local governments. This Part analyzes expected federal advances 
and barriers to achieving integrated flood management. Part V will consider 
local government authority and action related to flood management, and the 
impact of changed federal flood policy on local efforts. 
A. Limits of Climate Resilience Executive Actions 
Despite some cause for optimism, the climate reforms have limits. 
Because these actions are executive as opposed to legislative, they may 
	
 170  Id. at 15. 
 171  Id. 
 172  NOAA has encouraged the pursuit of climate science through incentives, provides 
climate data to help support analysis and preparation of changing weather, and measures the 
impacts of climate changes to sea level rise, etc. See Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 
Climate.gov: Science & Information for a Climate-Smart Nation, http://www.climate.gov/ (last 
visited July 16, 2016); Nat’l Ctrs. for Envtl. Info., Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., National 
Centers for Environmental Information, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ (last visited July 16, 2016). 
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prove vulnerable to political blowback.173 First, Republicans have challenged 
them in the media and will likely challenge them in court.174 “They also argue 
that in light of Congress’s failure to enact new legislation addressing climate 
change, the president has overstepped the bounds of his constitutional 
authority.”175 In response to Executive Order 13,690, seven Republican 
senators wrote a letter to the President challenging his authority.176 
Executive orders typically withstand legal challenge,177 but a legal challenge 
may erode its legitimacy with local governments. Also, the anticipation of a 
challenge necessarily constrains the drafting of the executive order on the 
front end. Commentators have noted that Executive Order 13,690 is 
conservative in that many local governments already use those flood 
standards now.178 Further, Executive Order 13,690 deliberately avoids 
addressing NFIP insurance rates.179 
In light of the 2014 repeal of the Biggert-Waters Act provisions imposing 
new insurance rates,180 the President may have foreseen that challengers 
would misrepresent the nature of the new directive; he likely included the 
insurance rate limit to reassure citizens that their insurance rates would be 
	
 173  And, of course, when a new president takes office, the entire climate resilience 
enterprise could fall, much as Australian climate change efforts disappeared when Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott took office. For a political cartoon that depicts the shift, see Cathy 
Wilcox, https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/236x/21/0e/be/210ebee9fb1da2fbe8943a2cdb459ff 
a.jpg (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 174  Ariane de Vogue et al., Supreme Court Blocks Obama Climate Change Rules, CNN, Feb. 
10, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/09/politics/supreme-court-obama-epa-climate-change/ 
(last visited July 16, 2016). 
 175  Robert V. Percival, Presidential Power to Address Climate Change in an Era of 
Legislative Gridlock, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 134, 149 (2014). 
 176  Letter from Sens. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), David Vitter (R-La.), John Cornyn (R-Tex.), 
Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.), Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), Roy Blunt (R-Mo.), John Boozman (R-Ark.), & 
Bill Cassidy (R-La.), to President Barack Obama (Feb. 5, 2015) (questioning whether President 
Obama sought input from mayors and other stakeholders which they argue was necessary 
before proceeding), available at http://www.cochran.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/815d07f4-
7aee-40ad-a97f-1701c8a44829/Letter%20to%20POTUS_FFRMS_05FEB2015.pdf. 
 177  Only a few executive orders have been deemed unconstitutional. See, e.g., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (declaring 
unconstitutional the President’s executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take 
possession of and operate most of the Nation’s steel mills).  
 178  See, e.g., Rachel Cleetus, Sea Level Rise, Growing Flood Risks, and the Need for a Strong 
Federal Flood Risk Management Standard, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS: THE EQUATION, 
(May 5, 2015, 12:12 PM) http://blog.ucsusa.org/rachel-cleetus/sea-level-rise-and-need-for-strong-
federal-flood-risk-managment-standard-725 (explaining that hundreds of communities have 
already adopted standards consistent with Federal Flood Risk Management Standard); 
Katherine Bagley, Congress Actually Dealt with Climate Change in the 2015 Budget Bill. Really., 
INSIDECLIMATE NEWS, Jan. 19, 2016, http://insideclimatenews.org/news/11012016/congress-
climate-change-omnibus-budget-bill-flood-standard-obama (last visited July 16, 2016) (noting 
that numerous local governments were already enforcing stricter building standards for flood 
zones); see also Council on Envtl. Quality, supra note 4 (explaining that hundreds of 
communities have “adopted standards which meet or exceed [the] new Federal standard.”). 
 179  Berginnis, supra note 34, at 16. 
 180  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020. 
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unaffected.181 Even if the executive orders themselves are not struck down, 
the agency regulations, promulgated pursuant to the executive orders, also 
could become targets.182 
The executive orders are also limited because they provide direction 
only to federal agencies rather than states and local governments. Without a 
federal mandate, local governments that do not have the resources or 
political will to factor in climate change impacts into their planning will 
continue to do nothing. 
Similarly, reluctant federal agencies have some opportunities to avoid 
implementation, especially if resources are tight.183 Political pressures can 
push agencies or local governments to resort to hard structures to please 
residents in the short-term.184 For example, the plan to protect beachfront 
homes lapped by the ocean in Fire Island, New York likely reflects such 
pressures. The Corps and Suffolk County have developed a plan to spend 
$170 million to create a new dune line.185 Forty-one houses are targeted for 
purchase at a cost of $46 million (largely borne by the federal government); 
other property owners have donated dune easements.186 The rub is that no 
one knows how long the dunes will last, but the mostly second-home 
dwellers will continue to enjoy summer at the beach until the next big 
storm.187 
B. Climate Resilience Reforms and Federal Law 
If the climate resilience reforms stand, will they move federal agencies 
toward more effective flood policy? Importantly, the reforms signify a 
commitment and leadership at the highest level.188 The Obama 
Administration has boosted improved, science-based data to inform federal 
	
 181  In fact, the National Association of Floodplain Managers has predicted that the insurance 
rates may go down because the measures will entitle the insured for more discounts. Berginnis, 
supra note 34, at 16. 
 182  In the absence of legislation addressing climate change mitigation, EPA acted under its 
Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3103–3233 (2012), authority to regulate greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) were pollutants. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532–5 
(2007) (holding that GHG were pollutants under the CAA and requiring EPA to undertake the 
endangerment analysis). Once EPA made an endangerment finding, it proceeded to use the CAA 
to develop standards relating to GHGs for tailpipe emissions as well as stationary sources. See 
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014) (rejecting 
EPA’s argument that a source’s GHG emissions triggered the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) program’s permitting requirements, but allowing the PSD program to apply 
to already covered, “anyway” facilities’ GHG emissions). 
 183  Flatt, supra note 10, at 170–71. 
 184  See, e.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, The Last Summer on the Beach, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2015, at 
MB1 (explaining that Long Island local residents and elected officials consider a beach 
renourishment project at Fire Island “a crucial bulwark for the mainland”). 
 185  Joseph Berger, Plan to Fortify Weak Shore Faces Dispute on Fire Island, N.Y. TIMES, May 
28, 2014, at A18. 
 186  Id. 
 187  Id. 
 188  GAO-15-290, supra note 1, at 69. 
7_TOJCI.TARLOCK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2016  12:54 PM 
520 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 46:491 
and local decisions.189 These executive directives charge federal agencies 
with integrating climate change’s potential impacts into decision making; the 
federal agencies have already begun to shift their flood management policies 
and planning documents. In addition to the climate-oriented reforms, some 
recent legislative changes also will improve flood management. These 
reforms sit atop of an existing, fractured system, however, and most likely 
will not cure all the ills caused by this uncoordinated approach. 
1. Positive Impacts on Federal Law/Policy 
a. Leadership 
The Obama Administration has demonstrated its commitment to 
preparing the nation for climate change’s impacts. As detailed in Part I 
above, task forces and directives seem to build on each other’s progress and 
create some momentum for change at the federal level. This momentum is 
reflected in agency action. 
b. Agency Action 
In response to the executive directives, federal agencies have prepared 
new adaptation plans, have developed resources for state and local 
governments, and begun to demonstrate a commitment to developing 
climate resilience. For instance, the Corps’ NACCS report and National 
Nonstructural Floodproofing Committee provide a risk management 
framework that reflects a shifted approach, including the Corps’ use of 
nonstructural tools to prevent floods.190 FEMA has begun, albeit slowly, to 
move toward including forward-looking data in developing FIRMs.191 In 
addition, FEMA released new guidance for state hazard mitigation plans, the 
State Mitigation Review Guide, that directly calls upon states to reduce risk 
by considering changing climate conditions.192 FEMA and NOAA also have 
been building models that better apply climate data at the local level.193 
	
 189  See, e.g., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 126, at 9 (discussing guidance 
requiring the Office of Coastal Resource Management to consider data collection and 
synthesis). 
 190  NACCS, supra note 8, at i. “Nonstructural measures addressed by the [Corps’] National 
Nonstructural Floodproofing Committee include structure acquisitions or relocations, flood 
proofing of structures, implementing flood warning systems, flood preparedness planning, 
establishment of land use regulations, development restrictions within the greatest flood hazard 
areas, and elevated development.” DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL WORKS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, 
CWTS 2013-3, COASTAL RISK REDUCTION AND RESILIENCE: USING THE FULL ARRAY OF MEASURES 5 
(2013). 
 191  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-28, CLIMATE CHANGE: BETTER MANAGEMENT 
OF EXPOSURE TO FUTURE LOSSES IS NEEDED FOR FEDERAL FLOOD AND CROP INSURANCE 19 (2014). 
 192  FEMA FP 302-094-2, supra note 162, at 3, 13. 
 193  Id. 
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c. Legislative Baby Steps (and Falls) 
Several areas of the NFIP potentially offer areas for improved flood 
management: 1) Biggert-Waters Act reforms relating to mapping, 2) 
increased use of Community Rating System incentives, and 3) climate 
resilience reforms relating to the availability and incorporation of climate 
data into FEMA’s actions. 
The Biggert-Waters Act of 2012 represented a bipartisan effort to 
improve actuarial soundness and program solvency. It eliminated 
“grandfathered” premium subsidies on second homes, severe repetitive loss 
properties and properties that have incurred flood-related damage exceeding 
the fair market value of the property.194 It also put measures in place to 
improve map accuracy.195 In a shortsighted move, Congress passed the 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which repealed many 
of the rate-related reforms.196 It left intact reforms that push FEMA to 
develop more accurate flood maps including consideration of future 
conditions.197 A more risk-based approach to flood mapping, with the 
establishment of the Technical Mapping Advisory Council, should improve 
map quality. The creation of a Scientific Resolution Panel to address 
homeowner challenges to flood map revisions also should improve 
decisions.198 
 
Concern about increasing rates may have motivated municipalities to 
seek discounts, through adopting more protective measures, eligible through 
the CRS.199 Climate resilience reforms most likely will improve NFIP because 
it promises better climate data, requires agencies to factor in climate change 
adaptation to its activities, and will require federal agencies to meet higher 
federal flood risk management standards in the floodplain. 
2. Obstacles for Implementing Climate Reforms into Federal Flood Policy 
While the climate resilience reforms have forced agencies to consider 
and plan for climate change in their flood management programs, the 
	
 194  See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100207, 
126 Stat. 405, 919 (requiring flood insurance premiums to reflect the current risk of flood); see 
also Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 
(BW12) Timeline, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1912-25045-8239/bw_time 
line_table_04172013.pdf (last visited July 16, 2016) (explaining that the Biggert-Waters Act “calls 
for the phase-out of subsidies and discounts on flood insurance premiums” for owners of non-
primary residences, business owners, and owners of property that has sustained flood damage 
that exceeds the value of the home). 
 195  § 100216, 126 Stat. at 927 (2012). 
 196  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 3, 128 Stat. 
1020, 1021. 
 197  § 30, 128 Stat. at 1034–35 (indicating that the only amendments made to the mapping 
provisions in the Biggert-Waters Act are related to notification and timing requirements). 
 198  § 100218, 126 Stat. at 930–32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4104–1(a) (2012)). 
 199  See KILLIUS, supra note 117, at 6. 
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implementation of these changes may face several obstacles: funding, 
coordination, and lack of mandatory requirements. 
a. Fiscal Issues 
The Obama Administration has shown commitment to advancing the 
federal government’s approach to flood management, but federal funding for 
flood management has generally declined over the last fifteen years.200 Some 
of the newer efforts have been funded through special post-disaster bills or 
special projects.201 Without more certain fiscal support, federal agencies will 
likely find themselves hamstrung and forced to choose between competing 
priorities. 
b. Lack of Coordination 
The interagency climate-related task forces have enabled the governing 
agencies to shape the executive directives, making them more 
implementable. Still, the ultimate change required by the directives happens 
within the individual silos of each agency. Because so many agencies are 
involved in flood management, the success of the reforms will vary between 
agencies and one agency’s reform may not coordinate with another agency’s 
action. The GAO remains concerned about the lack of coordination both 
among federal agencies and between federal, state and local governments: 
“[E]xisting actions and strategies do not clearly define the roles, 
responsibilities, and working relationships among federal, state, local, and 
private-sector entities, or how such efforts will be funded, staffed, and 
sustained over time.”202 
c. Weak Enforcement 
The concerns regarding coordination spill over to lack of monitoring 
and enforcement. As GAO has pointed out: “There are no programs to 
monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of 
federal efforts to reduce the fiscal exposure posed by climate change. Thus, 
there is no way to demonstrate progress in implementing corrective 
	
 200  See DANIEL J. WEISS ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HEAVY WEATHER: HOW CLIMATE 
DESTRUCTION HARMS MIDDLE- AND LOWER-INCOME AMERICANS 33–34 (2012) (discussing the 
declining appropriations for predisaster mitigation programs). 
 201  See, e.g., Matt Long, President Obama Signs Spending Bill that Includes Flood Relief to 
South Carolina, S.C. RADIO NETWORK, Dec. 18, 2015, http://www.southcarolinaradionetwork. 
com/2015/12/18/president-obama-signs-spending-bill-that-includes-flood-relief-to-sc/ (last visited 
July 16, 2016) (discussing $300 million appropriated for disaster relief in several states through 
a post-disaster bill). 
 202  GAO-15-290, supra note 1, at 69. 
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measures.”203 Accordingly, it is unclear whether the reforms will prove 
fiscally effective or protective of the citizenry. 
V. WILL CLIMATE REFORMS IMPROVE LOCAL FLOOD MANAGEMENT? 
The climate reforms also necessarily interplay with local flood-related 
policy. The existing federal legislative regime has led to uncoordinated 
competition among local entities for dwindling federal funds for structural 
“risk elimination” solutions.204 On their own, though, some local governments 
have led the way in adapting to increased flooding. This Part considers some 
examples of model local government approaches, available tools and 
obstacles, and the intersection of the climate reforms with local action. The 
federal, climate reforms call for innovative local planning that considers 
hazard mitigation. They are also flexible enough to allow local governments 
to forge ahead with progressive plans that may go beyond the federal 
recommendations. 
A. Local, Adaptive Planning 
Even before the recent federal reforms, and in the absence of specific 
or comprehensive federal requirements for state and local planning, cities 
and counties that face high flood risks began taking forward, climate 
change-based management steps. More integrated approaches to planning 
include the coordination of hazard mitigation planning with other land-use 
documents. 
Post-Sandy New York City and Miami-Dade County provide two 
examples of innovative adaptive planning, but many other local governments 
have begun similar efforts. For instance, New Orleans released a new master 
plan in 2010, titled “Plan for the 21st Century: New Orleans 2030” and issued 
the New Orleans Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance at the same time to 
ensure that the documents conformed to each other.205 
Private and public initiatives have supported these efforts. In the wake 
of Hurricane Sandy, the Obama Administration launched the Rebuild by 
	
 203  Id. 
 204  The President’s Budget for fiscal year 2016 allocates $4.732 billion for the Civil Works 
program of the Corps. Only $34 million is allocated for flood control and coastal emergencies. 
See Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, President’s Fiscal 2016 Budget for U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers Civil Works Released (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/ 
NewsReleases/NewsReleaseArticleView/tabid/231/Article/562964/presidents-fiscal-2016-budget-
for-us-army-corps-of-engineers-civil-works-releas.aspx. Both Democrats and Republicans in 
Congress have criticized continued shrinkage of the Corps’ budget. Sarah Gonzales, 
Appropriators say Corps of Engineers needs more, but not for WOTUS, AGRI-PULSE, Feb. 11, 
2015, http://www.agri-pulse.com/Congress-annoyed-low-Army-Corps-budget-proposal-02112015 
.asp (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 205  See 1 CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, PLAN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: NEW ORLEANS 2030 7 (2010), 
available at http://www.nola.gov/getattachment/4dcf72fd-b189-4937-bd69-dba2958a483e/Vol-1-
Executive-Summary/, for an analysis of the planning struggles that followed Hurricane Katrina. 
See also GARY RIVLIN, KATRINA: AFTER THE FLOOD passim (2015). 
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Design competition. The competition sought “innovative community- and 
policy-based solutions to protect U.S. cities that are most vulnerable to 
increasingly intense weather events and future uncertainties.”206 The project 
connected experts with local planners and citizens to help create 
“environmentally- and economically-healthier” solutions.207 The “100 
Resilient Cities Campaign,” launched by the Rockefeller Foundation, broadly 
aims to help cities become more resilient to physical, economic, and social 
challenges.208 It provides financial and logistical guidance, and access to 
expert advisors to create a network of resilient cities, and a model for 
resilience.209 
New York City has taken significant action to plan for climate change 
through its Commission on Climate Change, its PlaNYC process, its 
involvement in the Rebuild by Design program, and zoning changes. The 
PlaNYC process has led to 257 initiatives to improve resilience.210 After 
Hurricane Sandy, the city changed its building code to require buildings to 
protect to a level one or two feet higher than FEMA-designated flood 
elevation.211 In turn, the City Council passed the Flood Resilience Text 
Amendment, which modifies zoning to enable flood-resistant 
construction.212 
When New York City began to consider how to restore midtown to 
lower Manhattan, an area substantially damaged by Hurricane Sandy, it 
relied on climate models and considered the 500-year-flood-area for the 
year 2050.213 This forward-looking choice will provide the city a higher 
level of protection than if it had relied on FEMA’s backwards looking 
maps. New York’s resilience program has benefitted from federal support, 
including funding from a Community Development Block Grant for 
Disaster Recovery issued by HUD.214 NYC also has availed itself of support 
	
 206  Observatory of Pub. Sector Innovation, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Rebuild by 
Design, https://www.oecd.org/governance/observatory-public-sector-innovation/innovations/pa 
ge/rebuildbydesign.htm (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 207  Id. 
 208  100 Resilient Cities, About Us, http://www.100resilientcities.org/about-us/ (last visited 
July 16, 2016). 
 209  Id. 
 210  See CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC PROGRESS REPORT 2014, at 55 (2014), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_FINAL_Web.pdf 
(discussing the accomplishments and failures of the initiatives undertaken by PlaNYC). 
 211  Press Release, City of N.Y., Mayor Bloomberg Announces New Measures to Allow Home 
and Property Owners Rebuilding After Hurricane Sandy to Meet Updated Flood Standards (Jan. 
31, 2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/044-13/mayor-bloomberg-new-meas 
ures-allow-home-property-owners-rebuilding-after-hurricane (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 212  N.Y.C. Council Res. No. 1984-2013 (Oct. 9, 2013) (approving the decision of the City 
Planning Commission on Application No. N 130331 (A) ZRY, pertaining to enabling flood 
resilient construction within flood zones), available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View 
Report.ashx?M=R&N=Text&GID=61&ID=1477906&GUID=CDE9C427-599D-43C3-9DF6-
6A720D3094CB&Title=Legislation+Text. It also introduces regulations to mitigate potential 
negative effects of flood-resistant construction on the streetscape and public realm. See id. 
§ 64-00. 
 213  CITY OF N.Y., supra note 157, at 50. 
 214  Id. at 402. 
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through FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.215 Notably, both of 
these funding sources are made available only after disaster strikes.216 
Still, critics of PlaNYC argue that it does not go far enough in moving 
citizens out of harm’s way.217 
Miami-Dade County, which is on every map of adverse impacts from 
sea level rise, initiated a process to integrate potential climate change 
impacts into its local planning.218 The process first considered how hazards 
and climate change would impact issues relating to stormwater management 
and runoff, infrastructure maintenance and placement, and other planning 
efforts.219 Miami-Dade County produced “GreenPrint” in December 2010.220 
GreenPrint recognizes the importance of studying regional and local climate 
change trends and impacts.221 It emphasizes the need to “integrate future 
climate change impacts into community and government decision-making 
for capital, operational, and land-use issues.”222 
In 2012, Miami-Dade County went farther and prepared the Southeast 
Florida Regional Climate Adaptation Plan (RCAP), in cooperation with 
Broward, Palm Beach, and Monroe Counties.223 The RCAP sets forth a 
strategy for adapting to climate change by studying and monitoring changes 
to the environment and community, and developing plans that factor in 
climate change including sea level rise.224 The RCAP expects the 
participating communities to develop new flood maps that factor in sea level 
rise and storm surge modeling.225 It also promotes the integration of climate 
change data into its hazards emergency planning.226 
Progressive efforts by local governments stem from necessity to protect 
their citizens in the face of increased flood damage. These governments 
simply could not afford to wait for direction from federal governments. Not 
only do the local governments have the need to act now, but they also have 
the ability to understand the local conditions and the tools to undertake 
these efforts. 
	
 215  Id. at 403–04. 
 216  Id. at 402–04. 
 217  Andrew C. Revkin, Opinion, Can Cities Adjust to a Retreating Coastline?, N.Y. TIMES: DOT 
EARTH, (Aug. 22, 2013, 1:37 PM) http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/can-cities-adjust-
to-a-retreating-coastline/ (querying whether the New York City plan is “a good one or a stopgap 
that fits political imperatives of the moment while building bigger risks in the long haul?”). 
 218  City of Miami Beach, Climate Change & Sea Level Rise, http://www.miamibeachfl.gov/ 
green/default.aspx?id=74553 (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 219  FEMA INTEGRATING HAZARD MITIGATION INTO LOCAL PLANNING, supra note 43, at 5-2. 
 220  MIAMI-DADE CTY., GREENPRINT: OUR DESIGN FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, (2010), available 
at http://www.miamidade.gov/greenprint/pdf/plan.pdf. 
 221  Id. at 76–77. 
 222  Id. at 76. 
 223  SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT CTYS., A REGION RESPONDS TO A CHANGING 
CLIMATE: REGIONAL CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, at v (2012), available at http://www.southeast 
floridaclimatecompact.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/regional-climate-action-plan-final-ada-
compliant.pdf. 
 224  Id. at 13–14. 
 225  Id. at 17. 
 226  Id. at 39–41. 
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B. Adaptation Tools and Obstacles 
1. Local Power to Limit Floodplain Development 
Local communities have sufficient tools to discourage moral hazard 
behavior and promote climate-sensitive flood management.227 Tools include: 
1) state-mandated coastal planning; 2) rolling set-backs, especially those 
based on expected erosion rates; 3) the prevention of private armoring; 4) 
the purchase or condemnation of high at-risk properties, especially repeat 
offenders; 5) rebuilding requirements that minimize future storm or flood 
damage; and 6) the use of Transferrable Development Rights to compensate 
land owners forbidden to rebuild in high-risk areas.228 
The effectiveness of local regulation ultimately depends on states’ and 
local governments’ political will to face climate change, potential property 
rights’ or other legal challenges, and risk-shifting between communities.229 
Disparity between communities will be great considering that politicians at 
all levels are not only denying climate change, but also are refusing to 
acknowledge sea level rise. For instance, in 2012, North Carolina’s 
legislature considered a widely ridiculed bill to ban all local and state 
entities, other than the state Coastal Commission, from determining the rate 
of projected sea level rise; it also required the Commission to limit its review 
to historic data.230 In 2012, a less extreme version, but one that still limits 
consideration of sea level rise, became law without the governor’s 
signature.231 
2. State Response to Local Limits on Floodplain Development  
Flood control regulation that prohibits or severely limits floodplain 
development may trigger potential property owner claims of unfair 
discriminatory or unanticipated regulation. In general, no legal basis for 
such claims exists.232 The regulation of floodplain development is fair 
	
 227  The following paragraph draws on the comprehensive survey of the tools and their use 
by the Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change. ANNE SIDERS, MANAGED COASTAL 
RETREAT: A LEGAL HANDBOOK ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS 5–7 
(2013), available at https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/ 
files/Publications/Fellows/ManagedCoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pdf. 
 228  Id. at ii–vi; see Nicholas R. Williams, Coastal TDRs and Takings in a Changing Climate, 46 
URB. LAW. 139, 149–58 (2014) (discussing Transferrable Development Rights). 
 229  See Chizewer & Tarlock, supra note 12, at 1785 (discussing risks to a projects political 
viability). 
 230  Jane J. Lee, Legislating Sea Level Rise, SCIENCE, June 12, 2012, http://www.sciencemag. 
org/news/2012/06/legislating-sea-level-rise (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 231  Act of July 3, 2012, S.L. 2012-202, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws. 984. 
 232  See, e.g., Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 831 N.E.2d 865, 871 n.13 (Mass. 2005) (denial of 
building permit in state coastal conservancy district because, inter alia, a severe storm could 
detach the proposed house from its foundation); Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of 
Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971, 976 (N.Y. 1999) (rezoning of 150-acre golf course property 
important for flood storage from residential to solely recreational use is not a taking of private 
property). 
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because, when a property owner voluntarily exposes himself to risk, he 
lowers his expectation of compensation. As we have argued, much building 
in floodplains, at least today, can be characterized as moral hazard behavior, 
which should be discouraged, not encouraged.233 Society and individuals who 
put themselves at risk ultimately benefit from rules that discourage moral 
hazard development. 
Voluntary assumption of risk underlies the well established restrictions 
on the right to rebuild structures damaged by a flood.234 Existing structures 
in a floodplain that do not conform to present zoning standards can receive 
protection as non-conforming uses.235 But, if a property is destroyed by an 
Act of God, such as flood or hurricane, and a substantial percentage of its 
fair value is destroyed, most zoning ordinances only allow its rebuilding as a 
conforming use. This approach prevents property owners who live in high-
risk areas from rebuilding in a way that exposes them to the same risk that 
damaged their property. As early as 1951, the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
held that the owner of a non conforming beachfront restaurant, which was 
completely blown away by a hurricane, could not rebuild.236 The court’s 
reasoning leaves much to be desired,237 but the result remains good law 
today.238 State law, however, may constrict municipal options by encouraging 
inappropriate rebuilding.239 
	
 233  Allison Dunham, Flood Control via The Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098, 1103–117 
(1959), remains the classic synthesis of Gilbert’s White’s critique of flood control policy with 
police power rationales for restricting development in floodplains. 
 234  See Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 537–38, 541 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 235  See, e.g., Pappas v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Phila., 589 A.2d 675, 676 (Pa. 1991) 
(quotation marks omitted) (“As a matter of Pennsylvania zoning law, the owner of property to 
which a lawful nonconforming use has attached enjoys a vested property right.”). 
 236  Palazzola v. City of Gulf Port, 52 So.2d 611, 613–14 (Miss. 1951). 
 237  The court basically relied on Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1924), 
for the proposition that general ordinances are a proper exercise of the police power, although 
they also concluded, with no analysis, that the city’s ordinance was not an “unreasonable 
exercise.” Palazzola, 52 So.2d at 613. 
 238  E.g., Sams v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 63 A.3d 953, 985–86 (Conn. 2013); Motley v. Borough of 
Seaside Park Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 62 A.3d 908, 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); Ortell 
v. City of Nowthen, 814 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
 239  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (2016) 
  A zoning ordinance shall permit the owner of any residential or commercial building 
damaged or destroyed by a natural disaster or other act of God to repair, rebuild, or 
replace such building to eliminate or reduce the nonconforming features to the extent 
possible, without the need to obtain a variance as provided in § 15.2-2310. If such 
building is damaged greater than 50 percent and cannot be repaired, rebuilt or replaced 
except to restore it to its original nonconforming condition, the owner shall have the 
right to do so. The owner shall apply for a building permit and any work done to repair, 
rebuild or replace such building shall be in compliance with the provisions of the 
Uniform Statewide Building Code (§ 36-97 et seq.) and any work done to repair, rebuild 
or replace such building shall be in compliance with the provisions of the local 
floodplain regulations adopted as a condition of participation in the National Flood 
Insurance Program. Unless such building is repaired, rebuilt or replaced within two 
years of the date of the natural disaster or other act of God, such building shall only be 
repaired, rebuilt or replaced in accordance with the provisions of the zoning ordinance 
of the locality. However, if the nonconforming building is in an area under a federal 
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Many states have accepted the legitimacy of controlling floodplain 
development, and now are struggling to incorporate climate change risk into 
local land-use planning and regulation.240 Most state courts have effectively 
incorporated risk and moral hazard into land-use regulatory decisions 
designed to limit floodplain development.241 The Supreme Court, however, 
has not. 
3. The Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence’s Influence on Floodplain 
Regulation 
The disconnect between the states’ and the Supreme Court’s takings 
jurisprudence creates a problem. The Supreme Court’s takings cases involve 
floodplain management, but pay insufficient attention to the 1) rationale for 
floodplain regulation, and 2) the question of whether a known assumption of 
a risk is a legitimate investment-backed expectation. Instead, the Supreme 
Court’s takings jurisprudence focuses almost exclusively on the regulation’s 
impact on the property owner. 
	
disaster declaration and the building has been damaged or destroyed as a direct result of 
conditions that gave rise to the declaration, then the zoning ordinance shall provide for 
an additional two years for the building to be repaired, rebuilt or replaced as otherwise 
provided in this paragraph. For purposes of this section, “act of God” shall include any 
natural disaster or phenomena including a hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, 
wind-driven water, tidal wave, earthquake or fire caused by lightning or wildfire. For 
purposes of this section, owners of property damaged by an accidental fire have the 
same rights to rebuild such property as if it were damaged by an act of God. Nothing 
herein shall be construed to enable the property owner to commit an arson under § 18.2-
77 or 18.2-80, and obtain vested rights under this section. Id. 
 240  Recent administrative and legislative efforts include California and Florida. Supported by 
U.S. Geological Survey sea level rise maps, California has created comprehensive guidelines for 
sea level rise adaptive planning. CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, SEA LEVEL RISE POLICY GUIDANCE: 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES FOR ADDRESSING SEA LEVEL RISE IN LOCAL COASTAL PROGRAMS AND 
COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PERMITS (2015), available at http://documents.coastal.ca.gov/assets/slr/ 
guidance/August2015/0_Full_Adopted_Sea_Level_Rise_Policy_Guidance.pdf. Florida authorizes 
local governments to designate areas vulnerable to coastal flooding as “adaptation action 
areas.” Florida Community Planning Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 163.3164 (West 2016). Toronto, 
Ontario, has adopted a plan to increase the capacity of the city to absorb extreme rain events. 
City of Toronto, Climate Change Adaptation: Towards a Resilient City, http://www1.toronto.ca/ 
wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=78cfa84c9f6e1410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD (last visited 
July 16, 2016). 
 241  In addition to upholding zoning ordinances, other rationales can deter moral hazard 
behavior. These include abandonment of the use, Chiaraluce v. Ferreira, Nos. 11 MISC 
451014(GHP), 2014 WL 7466508 * 8 (Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 31, 2014), and public nuisance law, 
Sansotta, 724 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2013). In Sansotta, after beach erosion caused six cottages 
to shift seaward to the line of vegetation and a coastal storm left them stranded on a public 
beach, the town ordered the cottages to be torn down as public nuisances. Id. at 537. 
Nonetheless, the owners continued to repair them. Id. The court brushed aside a due process 
challenge to the order and subsequent assessment of fines for violating it because these types of 
regulatory actions “represent limitations on the use of property that inhere in the title itself, in 
the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already 
place upon land ownership.” Id. at 541. 
7_TOJCI.TARLOCK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2016  12:54 PM 
2016] SINK OR SWIM 529 
The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against taking property without due 
process applies to flood-related land-use controls in two situations: 
discrimination and surprise.242 First, the Fifth Amendment justifiably protects 
individual property owners from discrimination.243 Discrimination occurs 
when a single property owner (or a small group) is singled out to bear a 
disproportionate public burden.244 For example, it may be efficient to 
purchase easements on high-risk properties that prevent rebuilding after a 
flood or to condemn particularly vulnerable properties. Fairness demands 
that the government compensate property owners for agreeing to dedicate 
their land to a flood control strategy that produces benefits for a large 
area.245 
Second, governments should compensate a landowner when she has 
suffered substantial and unanticipated losses in property value.246 The Court 
incorporated the protection against surprise into takings law in its 1978 
decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (Penn 
Central).247 Penn Central upheld the landmark designation of Grand Central 
Station under a three-part balancing test, which implicitly narrowed the 
situations in which property owners could claim surprise by limiting 
compensation to cases where the government interferes with “distinct 
investment-backed expectations.”248 
Unfortunately, the Court’s erratic and inconsistent post-Penn Central 
takings jurisprudence incentivizes property owners’ moral hazard 
behavior.249 Behavior that exposes the landowner, and those in the 
	
 242  Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1232 (1967). 
 243  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 244  Id. (describing the purpose of the Fifth Amendment to include preventing government 
from forcing individuals to bear public burdens alone); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1077 (1993) (describing this principle in terms of protecting individual liberty). 
 245  Becky Hayat and Robert Moore, Addressing Affordability and Long-Term Resiliency 
Through the National Flood Insurance Program, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10338, 10347–48 (2015). The 
use of eminent domain to control floods can be controversial. In 2015, the Corps proposed a 
$1.9 billion plan to reduce hurricane flooding in high risk areas in Louisiana. Mark Schleifstein, 
Officials Object to Corps use of Eminent Domain in Hurricane Plan, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 17, 
2015, http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2015/06/state_local_governments_object.html 
(last visited July 16, 2016). Instead of building higher levees, the Corps proposed removing up to 
4,000 structures and included the use of eminent domain in areas that recently experienced 
damage. Id. In response, the state legislature passed a law prohibiting state participation in the 
project if more than 25% of the structures in the project were expropriated. Id. 
 246  See, e.g., Avenida San Juan P’ship v. City of San Clemente, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 570, 582 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2011) (upholding lower court’s finding insufficient notice for re-zoning as constituting a 
taking). Surprise cases often have a strong hint of irrationality. For example, the court found 
that a sudden severe down zoning was spot zoning and the open space justifications pretextual 
and probably designed only to benefit neighboring properties. Id. at 583. See also Michelman, 
supra note 241, at 1169–71 (discussing inequity in takings compensation jurisprudence); Joseph 
L. Sax, Land Use Regulation: Time to Think About Fairness, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 455, 458–60 
(2010) (same). 
 247  438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 248  Id. 
 249  There is an extensive debate in academia on the merits of this argument. See, e.g., Holly 
Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2003) (discussing the Court’s 
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surrounding area, to the predictable risk of serious damage inherent in the 
location does not trigger the fairness rationales for compensation.250 The 
unfair surprises component of takings law should only compensate victims 
of regulation who have suffered disproportionate, substantial, and 
unanticipated losses in the value of their property. 
Three major post-Penn Central decisions involve flood control 
regulations, and the Supreme Court found a potential taking in each.251 First, 
in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles 
County252 the court held that a church camp could claim a temporary taking 
after the camp was destroyed in a flash flood and Los Angeles County 
prevented it from rebuilding.253 The case established, for the first time, that a 
court may award damages for a temporary taking.254 The decision to locate 
the camp in a floodplain was a self-created risk, but neither the majority 
opinion nor Justice Stevens’s dissent discussed the desirability of preventing 
the landowner from engaging in a moral hazard. However, the Church’s 
victory was short-lived. On remand, an intermediate California appellate 
court held that that Church had suffered no damage under Penn Central 
balancing test because the property owner did not suffer a total loss of value 
and floodplain regulation is a public safety exception to a taking.255 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council256 is the Court’s most 
regulation-chilling decision. The Court held that a state setback regulation 
on a barrier island, designed to prevent houses from crashing into each other 
in a hurricane, was a per se taking because it deprived the landowner of all 
economic value of his land.257 The denial of development permission, after all 
the neighboring properties had been developed, was invidious 
discrimination, because the regulation came too late.258 
	
failure to address head-on the landowners attempt to alter the land in regulatory takings); Saul 
Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, & Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657 passim (1999) (arguing 
in favor of denying compensation resulting from regulatory change as incentivizing societally 
useful behavior in anticipation of change); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 571–573 (1984) 
(discussing the economics of considering compensation as insurance against regulatory risks). 
 250  See Dunham, supra note 232, at 1123–24 (discussing Due Process concerns). See also 
Robin Kundis Craig, Of Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: The Public Health Police Power As a 
Means of Defending Against “Takings” Challenges to Coastal Regulation, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
84, 93–94 (2014) (noting that the imminent and substantial threats hurricanes pose to public 
health and safety give rise to the public necessity defense, justifying a taking without 
compensation); Cindy L. Parker, Health Impacts of Sea-Level Rise, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L., May 
2014, at 8 passim (2014) (discussing sea level rise impacts to health); John D. Echeverria, 
Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2014) (discussing 
Koontz case). 
 251  This section mirrors the discussion in Tarlock, supra note 66, at 178–80. 
 252  482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
 253  Id. at 307, 322. 
 254  Id. at 307. 
 255  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. 
Rptr. 893, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 256  505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 257  Id. at 1008–09, 1019.  
 258  Id. at 1030–31. 
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South Carolina nonetheless argued that it acted well within its police 
powers, because the setbacks aimed to prevent a landowner from engaging 
in a harmful use, as opposed to unjustifiably and unfairly forcing him to 
confer a benefit on the community.259 The distinction has been urged as a 
useful test to decide when fairness demands compensation, but it was 
abused by Justice Brennan in Penn Central,260 and Justice Scalia dismissed 
the distinction on the ground that it was incoherent.261 According to Justice 
Scalia, a regulation that denies a landowner any valuable development 
option could only be justified if there was an inherent limitation on the 
landowner’s title—and none was found in the case.262 The test is dead for all 
practical purposes. Justice Brennan justified the distinction by suggesting 
that the destruction of the landmarked terminal was “harmful.”263 For all its 
questionable analysis, the much-parsed Lucas is a simple equal protection 
case. Lucas’s lot was the last undeveloped lot along the beach.264 The state 
applied a setback to a barrier island after development on all but plaintiff’s 
lots had occurred.265 
In a third Supreme Court case, which ignored the merits of flood 
damage prevention, a city conditioned its building permit approval on the 
landowner’s dedication of a portion of her property for improved storm 
drainage.266 This type of development exaction typically purports to offset 
the external costs of a specific proposed development; the Supreme Court 
requires an “essential nexus” between the impact of the development and 
the exaction, and “rough proportionality” between the exaction and the 
predicted consequence.267 The Court readily found a nexus between 
preventing flood damage and limiting additional development, but it 
imposed a very high burden on the city to justify the exaction: “The city has 
never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required 
in the interest of flood control.”268 Even after these three Supreme Court 
cases, courts will still likely uphold floodplain regulations, but cities and 
property owners will still consider takings challenges to regulations. 
Flood regulation may also be chilled because the Supreme Court has 
been reluctant to consider legislation discouraging moral hazard behavior as 
adequate notice to landowners that compensation will be denied or limited. 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island269 virtually foreclosed legislative notice, but left a 
door open to this approach. Rhode Island defended the refusal to fill a 
wetland on the basis that forty years of wetland regulation put landowners 
	
 259  Id. at 1022–23. 
 260  Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 136–137 (1978). 
 261  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026. 
 262  Id. at 1027. 
 263  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 n.30.  
 264  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008. 
 265  Id. at 1008–09. 
 266  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377, 379–80 (1994). 
 267  Id. at 386. 
 268  Id. at 393. 
 269  533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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on notice that it would be difficult to obtain such permission.270 The Court 
dismissed the argument that the purchaser of highly regulated property 
assumes the risk of development denial with the quip that “[t]he state may 
not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”271 Locke 
himself might be surprised that his labor theory now incorporates the 
Roman law right of ius abutendi, the right to destroy property.272 However, 
Justice O’Connor’s increasingly influential concurrence opened the door to 
the incorporation of moral hazard into takings law.273 She posited that the 
level of regulation was relevant to the property owner’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, and thus the level of reasonable 
compensation.274 Much like the California state court in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale,275 the Rhode Island trial court did 
a better job than the Supreme Court of analyzing the moral hazard issue and 
held that the proposed development would be a public nuisance.276 
Finally, in 2013, the Supreme Court took another major step away from 
the incorporation of moral hazard into takings jurisprudence in a case with 
widespread significance for floodplain regulation. Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Management District277 rewards behavior that increases the risk of 
flood damage. Koontz owned a 14.9-acre wetland, a potential floodwater 
retention area, and applied for a permit to develop 3.7 acres.278 He offered to 
transfer a conservation easement to the District on the remaining acres.279 As 
a first counter offer, the District proposed a permit to develop one acre in 
return for a conservation easement on the remaining 13.9 acres or a permit 
to develop the 3.7 acres in return for a conservation easement on the 
remaining acreage and a payment to improve nearby wetlands owned by the 
District.280 
	
 270  Id. at 614–15. 
 271  Id. at 627. 
 272  See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 787–89 (2005) 
(defining ius abutendi). 
 273  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634–635 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Recently, the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina followed Justice O’Connor’s analysis in Palazzolo. Columbia Venture, LLC v. 
Richland County, 776 S.E.2d 900, 914 (S.C. 2015) (finding that the purchasers of 4,461 acres in 
floodplain undergoing FEMA map revision did not have an “objectively reasonable” investment-
backed expectation). 
 274  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634–635. 
 275  258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 276  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 
2005).  
 277  133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). The critical literature is already substantial. See generally 
Echeverria, supra note 249 (discussing Koontz at length); Sean F. Nolon, Bargaining for 
Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court Invaded Local Government, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
171 (2015) (same); Julie A. Tappendorf & Matthew T. DiCianni, The Big Chill? - The Likely 
Impact of Koontz on the Local Government/Developer Relationship, 30 TOURO L. REV. 455, 467–
73 (2014) (same). 
 278  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591–92. 
 279  Id. at 2592–93. 
 280  Id. at 2593. 
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Koontz immediately sued under Florida’s taking law.281 In a 5-4 decision, 
the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court and 
held that the proposed condition was a taking.282 To do this, the majority: 1) 
extended strict scrutiny of exactions from the dedication of land to 
monetary payments,283 2) extended the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
to a situation where a landowner might be coerced “into voluntarily giving 
up property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise provide just 
compensation,”284 and 3) unduly discouraged local government-land owner 
negotiations with its almost de facto presumption that much local 
government regulation is extortion.285 The Court characterized the District’s 
counteroffer as “an unconstitutionally extortionate demand.”286 
The decision’s bite may be more limited. The majority did not decide 
whether the decision applies only to individualized negotiations or whether 
it applies to general, legislative exactions. Even if the Court chooses not to 
extend the rationale to general, legislative standards, it adversely impacts 
local land-use regulation of sensitive areas in two ways. First, it creates a 
disincentive to engage in negotiation.287 Second, it encourages cities to deny 
	
 281  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.617(2) (West 2010). 
 282  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 283  Id. at 2601. Koontz is hard, if not impossible, to reconcile with the decision in Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), where five members of the Court, including Justice 
Kennedy, who voted in the majority in Koontz, agreed that the government imposed financial 
obligations could not be a Fifth Amendment taking because no identified property interest is 
impacted. Id. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The majority in Koontz unjustifiably rejected 
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion, which correctly tagged the majority for refusing to reconcile 
adequately its conclusion. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603–04; see also Echeverria, supra note 249, at 
2–3 (criticizing the Court’s failure to explain or justify its ruling in light of pre-existing law). 
 284  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not create new 
liberties, but only protects those created from instances where the government burdens them 
with insufficient justification. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413, 1415, 1419, 1425 (1989) (stating that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds 
only that the government cannot condition an existing benefit on the surrender of a 
constitutional right). Thus, the Court seems to have created a “penumbral” and unnecessary 
takings right because: 1) if there is an exaction, Nollan-Dolan require a high justification; 2) if 
there was a taking, the standard should be the Penn Central balancing test; and 3) if the 
decision was arbitrary, substantive due process applies. 
 285  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595–96. 
 286  Id. at 2597. The Court did not mention that Koontz had already received a return almost 
15 times his original investment and potentially raised the return to 18 times. Koontz purchased 
the 14.9-acre parcel for $95,000.00 in 1972, and in 1987 received $402,000.00 when 0.7 of an acre 
was condemned for a highway. Before, the Florida Supreme Court decision, the District gave 
him the permit and Koontz sold the property to a development company—which never 
developed it—for $1,200,000.00. Thus, the case is about $376,000.00 temporary takings award. 
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 9, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), vacated, 
77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 287  Koontz makes it significantly easier for developers to drop out of negotiations and sue 
the local government over the allegedly “extortionate” demands that it has made during the 
permitting process. Koontz itself demonstrates all too clearly how this could happen. Koontz, 
upset with the District’s rejection of his development proposal, broke off his negotiations with it 
and filed suit. The dissent points out that Koontz was in the early stages of the negotiation 
process and that it is unclear whether the “extortionate demands” made by the District were in 
fact demands or merely nonbinding proposals. In fact, the Court’s refusal to provide standards 
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a permit, a practice that the Court approved. But, this exposes them to a 
takings suit that could have been avoided if the local government and the 
developer had negotiated a floodplain development plan that minimized the 
risk of flood damage. 
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence has a substantial, potential 
chilling effect on local floodplain regulation. First, it does not distinguish 
between rational resource management programs and regulations that seem 
to target an individual or small group of property owners without any 
broader resource management justification. The Court has come close to 
erecting a presumption that all local natural resource regulation is 
unjustified overreaching. Second, the jurisprudence does not give sufficient, 
if any, weight to whether the regulated landowner has engaged in moral 
hazard behavior and unjustifiably shifted the risk of damage to its neighbors. 
Third, the Court has failed to recognize that landowners should be expected 
to make decisions based on increased knowledge about the risks of their 
actions. FEMA’s flood mapping upgrades and the growing dissemination of 
the scientific consensus about the increased flood risks of global climate 
change make it even more appropriate to curb moral hazard behavior. 
C. Federal Climate Reforms Can Boost Local Government Resilience Efforts 
The Obama Administration’s climate resilience reforms potentially 
support local governments’ flood management efforts. Federal laws should 
set minimum standards for state and local land-use regulations through: 1) 
incentives and funding of state and local projects, 2) required planning, and 
3) construction of facilities that impact adjacent land-use.288 The federal 
government can provide local governments with improved information, 
implementation funds, and coordinating structures.289 Local governments 
will benefit from access to better regional assessments of climate change 
impacts. NOAA’s continued development of this data will prove very helpful, 
as will the Climate Data Initiative. But better coordination and distribution 
of this information is needed.290 
	
to distinguish between the two is a serious obstacle to collaboration between a local 
government and a developer. Tappendorf & DiCianni, supra note 276, at 471 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 288  See Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 255 n.7 (2012) (quoting FRED P. BOSSELMAN, DUANE FEUER & TOBIN M. 
RICHTER, FEDERAL LAND USE REGULATION 1–2 (1977)). 
 289  Alice Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical Axis, 39 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 390, 398 (2014). 
 290  As the GAO has noted: 
[T]he federal government plays a critical role in producing the information needed to 
facilitate more informed local adaptation decisions. However, this information exists in 
an uncoordinated confederation of networks and is not easily accessible, so state and 
local officials may make decisions without it or choose not to act at all. These decision 
makers often struggle to identify which information among the vast number of available 
datasets and studies is relevant. In April 2013, we recommended that a federal entity 
designated by the Executive Office of the President work with agencies to identify for 
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While federal funding remains tight, future administrations should 
continue to prioritize the climate resilience efforts to support the Climate 
Action Plan. Public-private partnerships may offer some funding 
opportunities for innovative and forward looking flood planning. 
Federal structure, guidance, and requirements can push the local 
governments to advance their flood protection management. The proposed 
federal flood management standard relates only to federal agencies.291 Some 
local floodplain ordinances already contain a similar standard.292 The next 
step is to require all at-risk local governments to raise their flood 
management standard. 
Agencies that provide grants to local and state governments can begin 
to build in more forward looking requirements that will help local 
governments prepare for climate change. NOAA has already begun to 
provide structure for states around planning for coastal hazards associated 
with climate change.293 Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) 
provide another opportunity to add requirements to promote climate 
resilience.294 Increased state and local involvement in the FIRM mapping 
program could provide a better understanding of local conditions and any 
on-the-ground changes—e.g., new development impacts the stability.295 The 
NFIP’s Community Rating System also can be promoted more aggressively 
to encourage more participation and ultimately smarter local flood 
management.296 
Although local governments have taken positive steps toward improved 
flood management and hold the authority to take more steps, they will not 
achieve consistent results without federal and state financial and legislative 
support. Local governments necessarily depend on a stable Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that values regulations that keep property owners out of 
harm’s way. 
	
local infrastructure decision makers the best available climate-related information for 
planning and to update this information over time. 
GAO-15-290, supra note 1, at 82–83 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
 291  See Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a Process for Further 
Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input, Exec. Order No. 13,690, 80 Fed. Reg. 2,645 (Feb 4, 
2015) (limiting floodplain management action to executive departments and agencies). 
 292  See, e.g., LADUE, MO., ORDINANCE 2,103 (Dec. 15, 2014) (repealing prior flood 
management standards and setting forth new standards in accordance with federal standards). 
 293  NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 126, at 1. 
 294  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CDBG NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE GRANTS (2015), 
available at https://www.hudexchange.info/onecpd/assets/File/CDBG-NDR-Grant-Introduction. 
pdf. 
 295  For instance, North Carolina became a Cooperating Technical State with FEMA after 
Hurricane Floyd made clear the need for updated and more accurate maps. NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS, LEVEES AND THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: IMPROVING 
POLICIES AND PRACTICE 52 (2013). North Carolina provided the LIDAR technology to update the 
maps. Id. 
 296  See supra notes 80–83, 116–19. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Longstanding governance norms favor local land-use control,297 and 
support local governments as the appropriate lead in flood management.298 
Cities such as New York City and Miami, among several others, have 
demonstrated that careful study of local conditions can lead to innovative 
approaches to integrating land-use and hazardous mitigation planning. State 
courts have respected these efforts by carefully analyzing the purpose of 
local regulations in context when evaluating takings claims. 
Local governments should not take on full responsibility for flood 
management, though. Lack of political will across states and localities, 
perceived risks that stem from takings jurisprudence, and financial 
difficulties all impose obstacles. Federal involvement in flood management 
can prevent disparity between states and provide an integrated structure 
that works across states lines. 
The Obama Administration’s climate resilience reforms can move 
federal flood management toward an integrated and risk-based approach 
based on climate science. They promote innovation and planning based on 
advanced climate data. The reforms call for local planning that considers 
hazard mitigation. 
The reforms as they stand are not enough. A Supreme Court takings 
jurisprudence that reflects the risks posed by global climate change will be 
crucial to implement the flood risk minimization policies adopted by the 
Obama administration. The strength of a climate change-based federal policy 
dissipates quickly if the federal government cannot ensure that 
local governments adopt effective policies to complement federal policy. 
This is especially important now when the federal government lacks a 
coherent flood protection legislative framework. 
The reforms are also fragile because they are based in executive orders, 
which can be readily changed by the next administration. They also cover 
federal agency action rather than address state and local action. However, if 
the federal agencies implement the executive orders effectively, they can 
influence positively state and local behavior. 
Promising developments at the local and federal level offer an 
opportunity to improve flood management in the United States. These 
developments must pave the way for larger scale reforms that require 
integrated flood management across the nation. 
 
	
 297  Kaswan, supra note 288, at 394 (citing Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: 
A Collective Action Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1174 (2010)). 
 298  See supra, note 294 and accompanying text. 
